molecular proposition that the sky is blue and the Moon is made of green cheese. Any proper parts of this kind are abstract.

The basic idea of the proposed analysis is that an entity’s being concrete depends upon “the kind of company it keeps” within an ontological category at level C. Entities that belong to such a common level C category essentially have an ontologically significant resemblance that suffices for their belonging to that category, even if they differ in some ontologically significant respect.

The proposed analysis of the concrete/abstract distinction gives the desired result in the problem cases described earlier. First, even if a Cartesian soul lacks spatial and temporal parts, a Cartesian soul belongs (or at least would belong) to a level C category, namely, Substance, which could have some (other) instance with spatial parts, for example, a horse. Thus, the proposed analysis of the concrete/abstract has the desired consequence that Cartesian souls are concreta. Moreover, because some times and places have temporal or spatial parts, this proposal has the desirable implication that respectively, times and places are concrete entities. Furthermore, even if there could be an abstract entity, e.g., Sleepiness, which stands in spatial or temporal relationships, it is impossible that an abstract entity has spatial or temporal parts. Thus, the proposed analysis has the desired consequence that every instance of the level C category of Property is an abstract entity; likewise for every other level C category of abstract entity.

Also note that the proposed analysis has the important advantage of being neutral about many ontological issues that other attempted analyses are not neutral about. For instance, regardless of whether universals are Platonic or Aristotelian, the proposed analysis implies that universals are abstracta. Furthermore, on the proposed analysis, Cartesian souls would be concreta. Moreover, the proposed analysis does not presuppose that all necessary beings are abstract, for whether or not time, space, space–time, or a substance are contingent or necessary, the proposed analysis implies that they are concrete entities. Lastly, the proposed analysis has the desirable implication that sets are abstracta, even if some sets have spatiotemporal location in virtue of having spatiotemporally located elements. For sets belong to the level C category, Set, and it is impossible that an entity which belongs to that category has spatial or temporal parts. Observe that because being a part is a transitive relation, whereas being an element is not, elements of sets are not parts of them. (The notion that a set has spatial or temporal parts seems to confuse a set with a mereological sum, that is, a concrete collection which has parts.)

See also the extended essay on realism and antirealism about abstract entities.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


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Consciousness The terms “conscious” and “consciousness” apply to a number of phenomena, all of them central to our mental lives. Though closely related, these phenomena are distinct, and require independent discussion.

One phenomenon pertains roughly to being awake. A person or other creature is
conscious when it’s awake and mentally responsive to sensory input; otherwise it’s unconscious. This kind of consciousness figures most often in everyday discourse.

A second phenomenon called consciousness occurs when a person or other creature is aware, or conscious, of something. One is conscious of something when one perceives it. One is also conscious of something when one thinks about it as being present; thinking about something as distant in space or time, like Saturn or Caesar, does not intuitively result in our being conscious of it.

Most important theoretically, we describe thoughts, desires, perceptions, feelings, and other mental states as being conscious when we are aware of those states in a subjectively unmediated way. Thus Locke (1975/1700) wrote that “[c]onsciousness is the perception of what passes in a Man’s own Mind” (II, i, 19). This kind of consciousness is a property of mental states themselves, rather than of individuals that are in such states.

Every conscious individual apprehends things in a characteristic way and from a distinct point of view. And an individual’s point of view brings a kind of unity to its conscious states. It is controversial whether this apparent unity is due to a connection among an individual’s conscious states or to some underlying aspect of the individual’s mental make-up (see persons and personal identity). Conscious states are seldom the focus of attention; they simply occur within our stream of consciousness. States we deliberately attend to are introspectively conscious. Such introspective consciousness results in our awareness of ourselves as mental beings and as centers of consciousness (see self-consciousness).

Locke, like Descartes, held that mental functioning is always conscious; as Descartes (1984/1641) put it, “we cannot have any thought of which we are not aware at the very moment when it is in us” (p. 171). Descartes and Locke thereby identify mind with consciousness; mental states are all conscious because being conscious is essential to being mental.

Not everybody accepts this identification. Freud (1966–74/1915) famously maintained that many mental states occur without being conscious and, indeed, that mental processes are not in themselves conscious. Most cognitive psychologists today agree, for reasons similar to, but not the same as, Freud’s. And even common sense countenances mental states that aren’t conscious; we sometimes know that somebody else wants or feels something, despite that person’s being wholly unaware of the desire or feeling.

Mental states fall into two broad categories: intentional states, such as thoughts and desires (see intentionality), and qualitative states, such as pains and perceptual sensations (see sensa). So all the states in one category might be conscious even if not all of those in the other category are. Thus Descartes held that all intentional states are conscious. By contrast, many today who acknowledge that intentional states are not always conscious nonetheless insist that all qualitative states are. How, they ask, could a mental quality, such as redness or painfulness, occur without one’s being immediately conscious of it? What would it be like for one to be in a qualitative state if that state were not conscious?

The idea that qualitative states are invariably conscious is inviting, and leads some to apply “consciousness” simply to conscious qualitative states. Even Freud (1966–74/1915) denied that emotions, which have a qualitative feel, can strictly speaking be unconscious; we loosely call emotions unconscious, he held, when the individual that has them is unaware of their true representational character.

Some theorists hold that consciousness marks an unbridgeable gulf separating people from the rest of reality. This reflects the odd cognitive disorientation that Wittgenstein (1953, I, §412) called attention to when we reflect about how, as conscious beings, we might fit into the natural order. Others have argued that we can accommodate and explain all the phenomena we call consciousness within a scientific framework (see the extended essay on the mind/body problem; mental/physical).

Much of the sense of mystery that surrounds consciousness results from assuming that all mental states are conscious. Since
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Consciousness involves mental functioning. We cannot explain it by appeal to anything that isn’t mental. But if being mental implies being conscious, perhaps any explanation of consciousness in terms of the mental will be circular. These considerations help bolster the sense that we cannot bridge the gap between mind and non-mental reality, but they result simply from assuming that all mental states are conscious.

Various writers have pressed other difficulties in explaining consciousness. Levine (2001) acknowledges that specific brain events very likely result in specific conscious mental qualities. But he urges, as does Locke (1975/1700), that there may be no way to explain why each brain event results in the conscious qualities it does, or indeed why it results in any at all. Chalmers (1996) concurs, arguing that this is the Hard Problem in explaining consciousness.

Others have argued that such explanation is possible. For one thing, Locke, Levine, and Chalmers all assume that qualitative properties cannot occur without being conscious, which restricts the range of possible explanations. Moreover, the sense that conscious qualities aren’t susceptible to scientific explanation may be largely due to our having at present no developed scientific theory about the connection between brain function and mental qualities. Levine contrasts our lack of understanding of that connection with the understanding we do have of water and its chemical composition. So perhaps when we come to have a theory of mental qualities and their connection with brain function which is as developed as current chemistry, the two cases will then be intuitively on a par.

Skepticism about explaining qualitative consciousness is also due in part to a widespread view, advanced by Locke (1975/1700) among others, that consciousness is the only way we can know about mental qualities. Even if we’re occasionally mistaken about what qualitative state we are in, consciousness nonetheless provides our only access to mental qualities. This view reflects the conviction, common since Descartes, that consciousness yields infallible, incorrigible access to our mental states, and indeed that consciousness reveals everything about their mental nature. And if we can learn about mental qualities only from consciousness, scientific explanation is precluded. This view again presumes that mental qualities only occur consciously, since if they also occur non-consciously, we would know about them independently of consciousness.

But subliminal perceiving is non-conscious, and it discerns the same qualitative similarities and differences that conscious perceiving does. So we have compelling reason to describe non-conscious, subliminal perceiving in the same qualitative terms we use for conscious perceiving. These similarities and differences, moreover, provide a way to describe and explain mental qualities independently of the way we are conscious of them (Rosenthal, 2005, Part II), thereby casting doubt on traditional claims of infallible or incorrigible access.

Nagel (1974) has argued that qualitative consciousness must be understood in terms of what it’s like for one to have a conscious experience, which may not seem susceptible to scientific explanation. But the very notion of what it’s like for one arguably runs together two independent aspects of conscious experiences.

As G.E. Moore (1922) emphasized, the qualitative character of conscious experiences, in respect of which they differ, is a different property from their consciousness, which they have in common. Even if qualitative states were always conscious, qualitative character would be a distinct property from the property of being conscious. So the two properties may well require independent explanations, which is obscured by just focusing on what it’s like for one.

Block (1995) has argued that the kind of consciousness that is special to qualitative character is distinct from the kind in virtue of which states figure in rational thought, action, and speech. Block calls the first phenomenal consciousness and the second access consciousness. And he argues that the two require distinct accounts.

Block’s distinction has been influential in philosophy and among scientific investigators, since qualitative consciousness is
plainly a special phenomenon. But it’s un-
clear whether phenomenal consciousness, 
as Block conceives of it, occurs in subliminal 
perception, which is not conscious in any 
commonsense, intuitive way. If it does, Block 
is simply distinguishing between mental 
qualities, which need not occur consciously, 
and consciousness ordinarily so called.

JACKSON (1986) has urged that, when 
an individual first has a novel qualitative 
experience, that individual learns some-
thing new, namely, what it’s like for one to 
have that experience. Moreover, no amount 
of physical information, he argues, would 
result in one’s knowing what it’s like for 
one to have that experience. Jackson 
concludes that what one knows in such 
a case is something non-physical. If so, 
conscious experience involves some non-
physical aspect.

But it may be that knowing what it’s like 
for one to have a particular experience is 
distinct from the kind of knowing in which 
one has information, physical or not. Perhaps 
such knowledge consists simply in being 
acquainted with the experience, that is, 
simply in being conscious of it. If so, physical 
information would fail to help not because 
the knowledge is about something non-
physical, but because information by itself 
ever results in one’s being acquainted with 
something. There is reason to think that 
knowing what it’s like for one to have a 
particular experience does consist simply 
in being acquainted with experiences of 
that sort. When one knows by having infor-
mation what something is, one can say that 
it is such-and-such. But simply knowing 
what it’s like for one to experience red, for 
example, does not enable any such infor-
mative statement about experiencing red.

A mental state’s being conscious consists 
in one’s being conscious of that state in a 
subjectively immediate way. This pivotal 
idea underlies a cluster of theories, accord-
ing to which a state’s being conscious is 
a matter of one’s having some awareness 
of that state. Because of the appeal to such 
higher-order awareness, these theories are 
known as higher-order theories.

The higher-order theory that has 
dominated traditional thinking about 
consciousness is the inner-sense theory, 
advanced by Locke (1700/1975) among 
others, and today by ARMSTRONG (1980) 
and LYCAN (1996). On this view, the higher-
order states in virtue of which we are aware 
of our conscious states are akin to perceptions.

But perceiving always involves some 
qualitative character, and the relevant 
higher-order states do not. So the compar-
ison with perceiving is arguably misleading. 
It’s tempting to see our higher-order aware-
ness as serving to monitor our mental 
states, much as actual perceiving monitors 
external and bodily conditions. But it some-
times happens that we are conscious of 
ourselves as being in states that we are not 
actually in, so as to build a picture of our 
mental lives that makes sense to ourselves or 
to others (NISBETT and WILSON, 1977). Such 
confabulatory consciousness goes against 
the monitoring model, and hence against 
the inner-sense theory.

An alternative higher-order theory holds 
that a state is conscious if one has a suitable 
thought that one is in that state (ROSENTHAL, 
2005). Our awareness of our conscious states 
will be subjectively unmediated if the relevant 
higher-order thoughts do not rely on any 
inference or observation that one is con-
scious of. This theory avoids the difficulties 
of the inner-sense model, and has various 
additional advantages.

BRENTANO (1873/1874) argued that our 
higher-order awareness of conscious states 
is intrinsic to those states. But this view is 
hard to sustain. The higher-order aware-
ness must involve a mental assertion, since 
doubting or wondering whether one is in 
some state does not result in one’s being 
conscious of that state. But no mental 
state is both a mental assertion and a case 
of doubting or wondering. So, when a case 
of doubting or wondering is conscious, 
the relevant higher-order awareness will 
be distinct from the doubting or wondering 
itself, and hence not intrinsic to it.

Some have challenged the basic principle 
on which higher-order theories rely, that 
a state’s being conscious consists in one’s 
being conscious of that state in a subjec-
tively immediate way. Thus SEARLE (1992) 
argues that we never observe our mental
states. But observing things is not the only way of being conscious of them.

Dretske (1995) urges that a state’s being conscious consists not in one’s being conscious of it, but in its being a state in virtue of which one is conscious of something. But subliminal perception also results in our being conscious of things; we are aware of the things we subliminally perceive, though not consciously aware of them. Indeed, subliminal perceiving would not affect our behavior and mental functioning if it did not make us in some way conscious of things. So Dretske’s theory has difficulty accommodating non-conscious perceiving.

Dennett (1991) has advanced a different challenge to higher-order theories, arguing that the relevant hierarchy of states is not psychologically realistic. There is no difference, he argues, between how things seem to one and how they seem to seem. But collapsing that distinction again leads to difficulty with non-conscious states, such as subliminal perceptions. Some form of higher-order theory very likely offers the best way to accommodate the difference between conscious and non-conscious mental states.

**Bibliography**


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Content  Mental states appear to come in two distinct kinds. On the one hand, there are states, like pains or tickles, whose nature is exhausted by what it feels like to have them, by their individuative phenomeno-
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