Half a century ago it was often held that the emotions lack the intentional content that characterize cognitive states. Logical empiricism had made popular the idea that certain sentences lack cognitive significance altogether and have only emotive meaning. Such sentences, it was held, simply express feelings, not cognitive states. And, since the content of speech acts reflects that of the mental states they express, if sentences that express emotions have no cognitive significance, those emotions themselves must lack the intentional content characteristic of propositional attitudes.

As the influence of these semantic doctrines has waned, however, it has become increasingly plain that a full description of the emotions does inevitably make reference to their intentional content. States such as joy, fear, anger, astonishment, sorrow, delight, and disappointment are all about things, and they all represent those things as having certain properties. The emotions, like cognitive states, do have intentional content.

But it is equally plain that the emotions are not just special cases of propositional attitudes, but are distinctive types of mental state. What is it, then, that distinguishes the emotions from cognitive states? Part of the answer doubtless lies with the phenomenal feel that emotions exhibit. There is normally a particular way one feels when one is angry, joyful, jealous, afraid, or sad, whereas the propositional attitudes have no such phenomenal aspect.

Although the occurrence of some phenomenal feel or other is characteristic of most emotions, phenomenal feel is a lot less central to the nature of those states than is often supposed. For one thing, emotions of different types frequently are not distinguishable in respect of their phenomenal feel. There is normally no discernible difference in phenomenal feel between fury and horror, devotion and compassion, fear and anger, disappointment and sorrow, though the emotions in each pair are strikingly different.

In any case, there are factors other than phenomenal feel that help distin-
guish the emotions from mental states of other sorts. One has to do with the centrality of the emotions for our understanding of the self. There is more to something's being a self than the collection of mental states it is in; those states must go together in a way that results in some characteristic unity and individuality. And it is arguable that the emotions are uniquely well suited to provide the needed unity and individuality.

For many emotions, very likely most, one cannot have the emotion without distinguishing oneself from other selves. This is not required for one to be in mental states of any other sort. Thoughts and desires can be about anything whatever, and sensations can represent any perceptible object, as well as states of one's body. And even when a thought, desire, or sensation does represent something that happens to be a self, the state need not represent that object as a self. By contrast, the very content of the emotions typically pertains to the interactions, real and notional, between oneself and other selves. Anger, envy, jealousy, indignation, affection, hatred, devotion, compassion, and contempt all normally concern other people. And although joy, fear, pride, disappointment, and disdain need not be about other people, interactions with others play a large role in the content of these states as well. Conceiving of oneself as a self in relation to other selves is necessary for most emotions.

Elsewhere, I have explored this characteristic connection between emotions and the self. In what follows I focus on another feature that helps distinguish the emotions from cognitive states, a difference in the way the two sorts of state come to be conscious. Propositional attitudes have intentional content, and so can be expressed in speech. Similarly for the emotions; when we are delighted, angry, sad, or hopeful, we sometimes say things that express those emotions. But there is a difference between what happens when we express these two kinds of state in words. Whenever one verbally expresses a cognitive state, that state is conscious. We never, or almost never, put thoughts in words without those thoughts' being conscious. By contrast, emotions can be verbally expressed without being conscious, and often they are. We say things that express our delight, anger, pleasure, or sadness even when these emotions are not conscious.

Why is it that cognitive and affective states differ in this way? Why should verbally expressing our cognitive states be sufficient for those states to be conscious, whereas verbally expressing our emotions is not? In what follows, I attempt to answer these questions. It turns out that the differences in the way cognitive and affective states behave with respect to consciousness and verbal expression is not due to any difference in what it is for the two kinds of state to be conscious. Rather, it is because of a difference in what happens when the two kinds of state are verbally expressed.

The link in the case of cognitive states between consciousness and being verbally expressed has doubtless encouraged the idea that an essential connection holds between language and mind. And, since consciousness has traditionally been regarded as central to the mind, that link may also have led to the insistence by some that cognitive states are the paradigmatic form of mental functioning. By the same token, the lack of any such link between consciousness
and the verbal expression of emotions may be partly responsible for the comparative neglect of the emotions in most theoretical treatments of the mind.

According to psychoanalytic theory, the beneficial effect of treatment results largely from unconscious states' coming to be conscious. But why should talking about one's feelings be necessary to achieve this result? The foregoing considerations help provide a theoretically motivated answer. In the case of cognitive states, simply expressing the states verbally is sufficient for them to be conscious. But this is not so for affective states, which matter more for therapeutic purposes. Simply expressing affective states in words cannot ensure that those states will be conscious. One must go farther and explicitly report or describe those states. For this reason, a satisfactory explanation of this difference between cognitive and affective states will very likely be relevant to psychoanalytic theory.

Accordingly, I occasionally consider in what follows certain aspects of Freud's own thinking about consciousness. After briefly reviewing some general issues that arise in explaining consciousness, I put forth and briefly defend a hypothesis about what it is for mental states to be conscious and about how conscious mental states differ from those which are not. Using that hypothesis, then, I develop an explanation both of why all verbally expressed cognitive states are conscious and why affective states may well fail to be conscious even when verbally expressed. I conclude with some brief remarks about how parapraxis relates to these conclusions.

I. FREUD AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Some things are so basic that they defy being explained in any useful way. And many have held that this is the case with consciousness—that consciousness is so fundamental that it resists being given any informative explanation. Our daily experience includes a constant stream of conscious thoughts, perceptions, and feelings. But simply having conscious thoughts, perceptions, and feelings does not help to explain what it is for these psychological states to be conscious. If all we can say about consciousness is how it subjectively appears to each of us, no truly explanatory account of consciousness is possible.

It is tempting to see the project of explaining consciousness as not just difficult or impossible, but also pointless. Everyday experience seems to encourage the traditional idea that all our thoughts, emotions, and perceptions are conscious. And if they are all conscious, it adds no information to say that such a state is conscious. If all psychological states are conscious, explaining consciousness is superfluous, once we have explained what thoughts, perceptions, and feelings are.

It hardly needs saying, however, that not all perceptions, thoughts, and emotions are conscious. There is much theoretical and experimental work in cognitive and developmental psychology, neuropsychology, psychoanalytic research and practice, theoretical linguistics, and the psychology of perception that establishes beyond question that mental functioning frequently occurs without being con-
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consciously. And this means that there is an explanatory task to do. Since some thoughts, feelings, and perceptions are conscious and others are not, we must explain what that difference consists in. My initial goal is to sketch briefly how this can be done.

Thoughts, perceptions, and emotions occur both consciously and nonconsciously. So one of those two ways of occurring must be the natural, default condition of these states. The natural condition of such states must be either the condition of being conscious or of not being conscious.

Settling which condition is the natural, default condition for thoughts, perceptions, and feelings is important because it determines what our explanatory task will be. If it is in the nature of psychological states to be conscious, we may well need no explanation of why some of them are conscious; that is simply their natural condition. But we would then need to explain why other such states are not conscious. If, on the other hand, psychological states are not in their nature conscious, we need not explain why the nonconscious ones are not conscious. But we would then have to discover what it is in virtue of which other such states are conscious.

It may, of course, be that some kinds of mental phenomena have as their natural, default condition that they are conscious, and others that they are not. Thus, some theorists have held that the default condition for cognitive states is not to be conscious, whereas affective states are in their nature conscious. I will come back to this possibility later. For now, I want merely to stress the more abstract point about what does and does not need explaining.

Perhaps nobody has been more intent to make theoretical room for mental states that are not conscious than Freud. So it is interesting to note a certain ambivalence in Freud's own thinking about consciousness. If psychological states are in their own nature conscious, we need not explain why some are conscious, but only why others are not. More important, if being conscious is the natural condition for mental states, their being conscious may well seem unexplainable. And this, somewhat surprisingly, seems to have been Freud's attitude. As he wrote in 1938, consciousness is a "unique, indescribable" quality of mental states, and "the fact of consciousness" "defies all explanation or description."5

Still, with an exception I will note later on, Freud also explicitly held that the default condition for mental states is not the condition of being conscious. In his words, "mental processes are in themselves unconscious."3 And again: "[t]he mental, whatever its nature may be, is in itself unconscious." Consciousness, he wrote, is "an inconstant quality" of mental occurrences, "one that is far oftener absent than present."6 So it is puzzling that Freud should also have believed that consciousness "defies all explanation or description."7

It is tempting to speculate that Freud was led to this conclusion by the central place in his thinking of the mechanism of repression. Because of repression, certain mental states that would ordinarily be conscious are instead unconscious. Repression explains why those mental states are not conscious and what it is for them not to be conscious. By contrast, Freud had no similarly straightforward mechanism to explain what it is for conscious states to be conscious, and hence
no explanation of consciousness. Still, if he was right about the general point that mental states are not in themselves conscious, we do need an explanation of why the conscious ones are conscious.

II. EXPLAINING CONSCIOUSNESS

I completely concur that the natural, default condition for mental states is not that of being conscious. Being conscious is an additional property that some psychological states have and others do not. How, then, can we explain the difference between those mental states which are conscious and those which are not?

At bottom, the difference between states that are conscious and those which are not is this: When a mental state is conscious, one is in some way conscious of that state. By contrast, when a mental state is not conscious, one is in no way conscious of it.

This preliminary characterization may, initially, sound circular, but it is not. We are conscious of lots of things. We are conscious of all the things we see and hear and taste and touch, and conscious in a different way of all the things we think about. Seeing and hearing Clinton and thinking about him are all ways of being conscious of Clinton.

Moreover, we are conscious not only of people and other objects, but of our own states of mind. I can be conscious that I want something to eat, or conscious that I am seeing Clinton, or conscious that I am thinking about Clinton. And that is just what happens when these states of mind are conscious—when, that is, my wanting something or seeing or thinking about somebody are conscious states. When these states are conscious, I am conscious, in a characteristic way, of those states. The reason this is not circular is that being conscious of things is a far more general property than a state’s being conscious; so there is no problem in characterizing what it is for a state to be conscious in terms of our being conscious of that state.

Still, more must be said before we fully understand what it is for a psychological state to be conscious. Suppose I am angry at somebody, but unaware that I am. And suppose that my being angry becomes evident to somebody else, and that person informs me that I am angry. I believe that person, and so come myself to believe that I am angry. That is, I become conscious of my anger. Nonetheless, I may not come consciously to feel any anger; in that case, I am conscious of my anger, but my anger is not conscious. What is missing? What is it that is special about the way we are conscious of our mental states when those states are conscious?

What is special when my anger is conscious is that I am conscious of that anger in a way that seems and feels immediate. And that may well not happen when I simply take somebody else’s word for it that I am angry. We can, moreover, explain what this apparent immediacy consists in. When it occurs, I am conscious of being angry in such a way that there seems to me to be nothing mediating between the anger and my being conscious of it. More generally, when any thought,
feeling, or perception is conscious, one is conscious of that state in a way that seems to one to be unmediated in this way.

As I mentioned above, there are different ways we can be conscious of things. We are conscious of things when we see them or hear them or perceive them in some other way. And we are conscious of things when we have thoughts about them. So we must determine which of these ways of being conscious of things figures in our mental states' being conscious. When our feelings, thoughts, and perceptions are conscious, are we conscious of them because we sense them in some way, or because we have thoughts about them?

Many thinkers have found the first model inviting. Philosophers from Aristotle to John Locke and down to the present day have held that we perceive our conscious states by way of a kind of inner sense. Freud, too, seems to have adopted this model. Thus in his meta-psychological paper, "The Unconscious," he recommends that we "liken the perception of [mental processes] by means of consciousness to the perception of the external world by means of the sense-organs."1

I want to urge, however, that this is the wrong model. A number of considerations support this conclusion. For one thing, there is no dedicated sense organ for sensing our thoughts, perceptions, and affective states. Moreover, all sensing involves some distinctive sensory modality; indeed, there is a range of distinctive sensory qualities specific to each modality. Sensing by sight, for example, involves color qualities, and sensing by sound auditory qualities.

But the only qualities that figure when we are aware of our mental states are the qualities of the states we are aware of, not qualities that pertain to our awareness of those states. When we see something consciously, for example, the only relevant qualities are the color qualities of our visual sensations. Similarly for the other kinds of mental phenomena we are conscious of. There are no qualities that characterize our sensing of mental phenomena.2

For these and other reasons, we must reject the idea that, when our thoughts, feelings, and sensations are conscious, we are perceptually aware of those states. Still, we are conscious of them somehow. The only alternative is that we have thoughts about these states. Since these thoughts are about other mental states, I shall refer to them as higher-order thoughts (HOTs).

It goes without saying that we are seldom aware of having any such HOTs about our mental states. Almost all the conscious perceptions, thoughts, and feelings we have in ordinary waking life seem to us to be altogether unaccompanied by HOTs. Does this confute the HOT model? No. We will be aware of our HOTs only if those HOTs are conscious thoughts. And there is no reason to expect that in ordinary cases our HOTs will be conscious thoughts. Only when we focus introspectively on our mental states are those HOTs conscious.

One reason many thinkers have favored the perceptual model of how we are conscious of our conscious thoughts and feelings is that this model appears to explain why we are conscious of those states in a way that seems unmediated. When we see and hear physical objects, nothing seems to mediate between the
things we see and hear and our perceptual awareness of them. And that is how it seems when our mental states are conscious. This has led many to overlook the shortcomings of the perceptual model, with its commitment to a special sense and to mysterious sensory qualities.

But the HOT model can capture equally well the apparent immediacy of the way we are conscious of our conscious thoughts and feelings. When thoughts and feelings are conscious, the HOTs that make us conscious of those thoughts and feelings typically are not conscious. So we are aware of those thoughts and feelings without having any idea about how we are aware of them. Since our awareness of the states in these cases seems thus automatic, plainly nothing seems to us to mediate between those thoughts and feelings and our awareness of them.

When we focus introspectively on our conscious thoughts and feelings, however, we are conscious of having HOTs about those thoughts and feelings. Nonetheless, we remain completely unaware of any thought process that leads to our having those HOTs. So again it seems that nothing mediates between those thoughts and feelings and our consciousness of them. Insofar as our HOTs are conscious at all, those thoughts seem to us to be entirely spontaneous. This is unlike those cases in which the only way we are conscious of being angry, for example, is by believing what somebody tells us.

The HOT model explains exactly what is needed. It explains the difference between mental phenomena that are conscious and those which are not. On their own, thoughts, perceptions, and feelings are not conscious. Their sometimes being conscious consists in their being accompanied in those cases by suitable HOTs about them. By 'suitable', I mean that whenever the HOT is conscious, it seems spontaneous, and therefore unmediated. These HOTs make us conscious of our conscious thoughts, feelings, and perceptions, though typically the HOTs are not themselves conscious.

Freud and others have sometimes held that, unlike thoughts and desires, emotions and bodily feelings cannot occur without being conscious. As Freud put it: "It is surely of the essence of an emotion, that we should be aware of it... Thus the possibility of the attribute of unconsciousness would be completely excluded so far as emotions, feelings and affects are concerned." Freud noted that we "speak in a condensed and not entirely correct manner, of 'unconscious feelings'"; but we do so, he held, only because the representational character of the feelings is repressed or misrepresented.

Doubtless many cases of so-called unconscious feelings are of this sort, and therefore are not literally unconscious. Sometimes, for example, we are aware of being angry, but misdescribe or are unclear as to what that anger is about. Still, the unreportable anger described earlier gives us good reason to reject the general conclusion that affective states cannot literally fail to be conscious. Cases do occur in which a person is plainly angry but sincerely denies being angry. That sincere denial is compelling evidence that the anger simply fails to be conscious. Still, we can describe the person's anger in such cases in terminology that is char-
acteristically mental; we can say whether the anger is intense or slight, and say what its object is, that is, what the person is angry about. And, as Freud noted for the case of cognitive states, the fact that we use the same terminology to describe the unconscious states as we use to describe conscious mental states is convincing evidence that the unconscious states are mental in nature.14

III. CONSCIOUSNESS AND REPORTABILITY

This, in broad strokes, is the HOT model of consciousness, and some of the reasons for thinking that it is true. For the rest of this discussion, I want to talk about some applications of the model, which provide useful confirmation of it. These applications should also help make the model somewhat more concrete.

When a person is angry, or thinking about somebody, or even perceiving something, the person’s anger, thought, or perception may or may not be conscious. When it is conscious, the person can talk about it. The person can say, for example, such things as “I am angry,” “I am thinking about that person,” and “I see (or hear) that thing.” These remarks will be based on no conscious inferences, either from what others have told the person or anything else. They will be spontaneous remarks about the person’s own states of mind.

Even when one’s anger, thought, or perception is not conscious, however, one may well behave in ways that reveal the anger, thought, or perception. But when those states are not conscious, one cannot tell others about them. At least, one cannot tell others about those states in the spontaneous way that is characteristic for the case of conscious states. One might still say things in a way that reveals these unconscious states; one might, for example, speak with an angry tone. But if one’s anger is not conscious, one cannot spontaneously report to others that one is angry.

The HOT model provides the best explanation of this connection between consciousness and spontaneous reportability. To see this, consider the general connection that invariably holds between the statements we make and the thoughts those statements express. Suppose I say to you, “Clinton will win.” My remark expresses my thought to the effect that Clinton will win. And in general, whenever one says anything at all, one’s remark expresses some thought one has to the same effect as the remark itself.

Suppose, now, that I am consciously angry and I say that I am. My remark, “I am angry,” expresses a thought I have. That thought is the thought that I am angry. It is a HOT about my anger. Saying that I am angry invariably expresses a HOT to the effect that I am angry.

When my thoughts and feelings are conscious, I can spontaneously tell others about those states; when my thoughts and feelings are not conscious, I cannot. The best explanation of this difference is that, when my thoughts and feelings are conscious, I have HOTs about those thoughts and feelings. Because I have these HOTs, I can express them in speech, by saying explicitly that I have those thoughts and feelings. And when my thoughts and feelings are not conscious,
we can best explain my inability spontaneously to say these things by appeal to the absence in these cases of any such HOTs. I cannot express HOTs that I do not have.

These observations corroborate the hypothesis that a thought or feeling’s being conscious is a matter of its being accompanied by a HOT about that thought or feeling. Moreover, this hypothesis applies equally to cognitive and to affective states. As noted earlier, it is true of both types of state that I can spontaneously report them if they are conscious, whereas I cannot if they are not conscious. And for both types of state, the reason we can spontaneously report them when they are conscious but not when they are not is that only the conscious ones are accompanied by suitable HOTs. It is these HOTs that we express when we spontaneously report our conscious states. The very same factor is responsible for the consciousness of both our cognitive and our affective states.¹⁵

IV. CONSCIOUSNESS AND EXPRESSION

What it is to be conscious is the same for cognitive and affective states. Nonetheless, it turns out that there are interesting and important differences in the way this model applies to the two types of state.

I mentioned earlier that, although I cannot spontaneously report my mental states when those states are not conscious, still, I may behave in a way that manifests those states. Suppose I am angry; even if my anger is not conscious, my facial expressions, manner, and bodily movements may well betray that anger. These things serve to express my anger, but they express it nonverbally. Things are the same way with thoughts and other cognitive states. My facial expressions and bodily movements may well reveal what I am thinking. For a trivial example, taking my umbrella may express nonverbally my belief that it is raining.

Often, of course, we reveal our thoughts and feelings verbally, by our use of words. When I tell you what I think or feel, I reveal those thoughts and feelings. But explicitly saying what one thinks and feels is not the only way we reveal in words what thoughts and feelings we have. We also express those thoughts and feelings in words. As we shall see, it is crucial to distinguish verbally expressing our thoughts and feelings both from explicitly reporting those states and from expressing the states nonverbally.

Let us begin with thoughts and other cognitive states. Suppose I think it is raining. I can express that thought verbally by saying “It’s raining.” Or I could explicitly report my thought, by saying “I think it’s raining.” Or, again, I can express the very same thought nonverbally, by taking my umbrella. The question I want to focus on is how these differences relate to consciousness.

When I report my thought, by explicitly saying “I think it’s raining,” we have seen that that thought must be a conscious thought. Reporting the thought that it is raining expresses my HOT that I think it is raining, and that HOT makes me spontaneously conscious of my thought that it is raining. By contrast, if I nonverbally express my thought that it is raining, that thought need not be conscious. Though my taking my umbrella manifests my thought that it is raining, that
thought may well not be conscious. I might take the umbrella absently, as we colloquially say, "without thinking"—that is, without consciously thinking.

What about the intermediate case, in which I neither report my thought explicitly nor express it nonverbally, but rather express it verbally? I verbally express my thought that it is raining by simply saying, "It's raining." And it turns out that, when I express my thought verbally in this way, the thought is always conscious. Similarly with all our thoughts and other cognitive states. Saying "Clinton will win" expresses verbally my thought that Clinton will win; and whenever I do verbally express that thought, the thought is conscious. Indeed, with a certain exception that I will disregard here, we never, as noted above, say anything that expresses a thought or other cognitive state without that cognitive state's being conscious.

Let us now switch our attention to affective states. Suppose I am angry at you for doing a certain thing. If my anger is conscious, I might explicitly report the anger, by saying "I'm angry with you." Or I might express my anger nonverbally, say, by some facial expression or body language. And, as with cognitive states, when I nonverbally express my anger, the anger may or may not be conscious.

But how, then, might I verbally express my anger? Verbally expressing the different kinds of cognitive state relies on distinct forms of speech which reflect the kind of state being expressed. If I wonder something, I express my wondering of that thing by asking a question; if I believe something, I express that with an assertion; if I want you to do something, I can speak in the imperative mood; if I wish for something, I speak in the subjunctive or optative. But there exist no set forms of speech corresponding to the different kinds of affective state.

This difficulty cannot be handled by explicitly mentioning the affective state in question. Recall that when I say "I am angry" I report my anger; I do not verbally express it. Saying something that explicitly mentions my anger constitutes a report of the anger. So the question remains as to how we verbally express our anger, as opposed to reporting it.

The answer is that I verbally express my anger at what you did by saying such things as "You shouldn't have done that" or "What you did was bad (or unacceptable, or uncalled for, and the like)." Saying these things expresses my anger, but without explicitly mentioning it—without, that is, reporting it. It may be that these things are sometimes also said without any hint of underlying indignation, that they are said as pure, objective judgments of the lack of merit in what you did. But that is probably rare. In any event, all that is needed for present purposes is a form of speech that in many cases, even if not in all, verbally expresses one's anger and does so with no explicit mention of that anger.

Whenever I say "It's raining," thereby verbally expressing my thought that it is raining, that thought is conscious. But things are importantly different when I verbally express my anger and other affective states. When I verbally express my anger at what you did, by saying, for example, "What you did was uncalled for," the underlying anger may or may not be conscious. Verbally expressed cognitive states are invariably conscious; verbally expressed affective states need not be.
As we have seen, the HOT model of consciousness explains why the mental states we explicitly report must be conscious. Can the model also explain the difference I have just drawn attention to between cognitive and affective states? Why is it that verbally expressed affective states need not be conscious but verbally expressed cognitive states must be?

In the case of affective states, such as anger, the HOT model plainly predicts the right thing. When I verbally express my anger by saying “What you did is inappropriate [or the like],” there is no reason to think that I must have any HOTs about my anger. Even if I am angry, it may be that the only relevant thought I have is that what you did is inappropriate. I may be wholly unaware of my anger. Saying “What you did is inappropriate” may express my anger without my in the least realizing that it does so. In this way, verbally expressing anger resembles expressing anger nonverbally, say, by one’s body language or facial expression. There, too, one may be wholly unaware of one’s anger, and so wholly unaware that one’s body language or facial expression expresses it. Clearly, the HOT model explains why we can verbally express affective states even when those states are not conscious.

What we need, then, is an explanation of why things are different with cognitive states. When I say “It’s raining,” I verbally express my thought that it is raining. But my remark does not express any HOT about my thought that it is raining. It expresses only my thought that it is raining. Why, then, are all verbally expressed thoughts conscious? And can the HOT model explain why they are, given that saying “It’s raining” verbally expresses only my thought that it is raining, and not any HOT?

When a person thinks it is raining, there are two distinct ways the person might convey this thought in words. The person might simply say, “It’s raining,” thereby verbally expressing the thought that it is raining. Or the person might say “I think it’s raining,” thereby reporting that thought. In saying “It’s raining,” one explicitly refers only to the weather, whereas the remark “I think it’s raining” refers explicitly to one’s thought about the weather.

But even though the two remarks literally mean different things, they have the same colloquial force. Saying “I think it’s raining” is literally describing what one thinks, but the obvious conversational effect is to convey something about the weather. The two remarks are distinct semantically, but conversationally and pragmatically they are equivalent. Any differences between the two in respect of the degree of confidence expressed can be readily cancelled, or even reversed, by change of emphasis or context.

Even more crucial for our purposes, this equivalence is entirely second nature for anybody who understands how we talk about our thoughts. It is a bad joke to take the remark “I thinks it’s raining” to be not about the weather, but just about the person’s thoughts. It is a bad joke because the conversational equivalence between that remark and the remark “It’s raining” is completely automatic to anybody with ordinary abilities to speak and understand. Because of this automatic conversational equivalence, it is largely a matter of indifference whether somebody says “It’s raining” or “I think it’s raining.” Indeed, we typi-
cally may not recall, even a moment later, which of the two was said, either by us or by somebody else.

This has important implications about verbal expressions and consciousness. Suppose I think it is raining. If, then, I say "I think it's raining," I express a HOT about my thought that it is raining. My thought that it is raining would then have to be a conscious thought.

But the automatic conversational equivalence just described tells us that, even when I say "It's raining," I might equally well have said "I think it's raining." That is, I might equally well have verbally expressed a HOT about my thought that it is raining. Since I might equally well have expressed that HOT, I must have had the HOT, even though all I actually said was that it is raining. The automatic conversational equivalence of saying "It's raining" with saying "I think it's raining" means that the HOT will be present whichever of the two I say. Even when we verbally express our thoughts, those thoughts must be conscious.

When we express our thoughts nonverbally, however, no such automatic conversational equivalence applies. If I take my umbrella, thereby expressing my thought that it is raining, no automatic equivalence holds between my act of taking the umbrella and my saying "I think it's raining." So, no reason exists in that case to think that I have any HOT about my thought that it is raining. The thoughts we express nonverbally need not be conscious thoughts.

The automatic conversational equivalence that does the work here is also absent when we express our affective states, even when we express those states verbally. Suppose I am angry at you and I verbally express that anger by saying "What you did was uncalled for." There is no automatic conversational equivalence between making that kind of remark and saying "I am angry with you." So, again, we have no reason in this case to think that one has a HOT about one's anger. Verbally expressing our cognitive states is enough to make one conscious of them; verbally expressing affective states is not. And, since the consciousness of affective states is assured only when we explicitly describe them, active states are, Freud and others to the contrary (see p. 300 above), one step further removed from consciousness than cognitive states.

Sometimes, when I say such things as "You shouldn't have done that" or "What you did was bad (or unacceptable, or uncalled for)," I express my anger at you. But it is also possible to say these things wholly dispassionately and without any feeling, whether conscious or not. In such a case, I simply express my thought that you should not have done that, or that what you did was bad (or unacceptable, or uncalled for). In yet other situations, my remark may do both things: it may at once express my anger and express my thought about the unfortunate character of your behavior.

Our occasional use of remarks of this kind to express dispassionate thoughts with no accompanying emotion makes it easy, when these remarks do express emotions, to remain unaware of those emotions. Saying "What you did was wrong" sometimes expresses only a dispassionate appraisal of somebody's action, with no angry feeling. So, even when the remark does express anger, one may regard oneself as expressing only a dispassionate thought; one may see one-
self as simply commenting on the unmeritorious character of an action. In such a case one will have a HOT to the effect that one regards the action as unfortunate, but no HOT that one is angry. One's HOTs neglect the affective aspect of the mental states expressed by one's remark. One's speech act verbally expresses anger that is not conscious.

My remark that what you did was wrong may express my anger or my dispassionate thought or both. When it expresses my thought or both thought and anger, the thought is invariably conscious. But even when my remark expresses only my anger, I will have a HOT to the effect that I have the thought that what you did was wrong. That is so whether or not I am also conscious of my anger. The remark "What you did was wrong" is performance-conditionally equivalent to saying "I think what you did was wrong," and that equivalence is second nature for us. So whenever I say that what you did was wrong, I will have a HOT to the effect that I think that thing.

Many speech acts function in these two ways, sometimes as an expression of some emotion and other times as an expression of a dispassionate judgment about something's merits. This double role is part of what underlies the logical empiricists' insistence that apparent normative judgments are no more than verbal expressions of emotions. Speech acts have the same content as the mental states they expression. So, since anger, for example, can be verbally expressed by statements such as "You shouldn't have done that," the normative content of these remarks reflects the very content of the state of anger that such remarks sometimes express. Similarly for other emotions and their verbal expressions.

These considerations cannot, however, sustain the logical empiricists' contrast between cognitive and emotive meaning. As noted earlier, the emotions themselves do have intentional content; so their verbal expressions have cognitive significance, just like other, nonevaluative statements. Moreover, the speech acts that verbally express emotions also often double as verbal expressions of cognitive states.

Affective states may not be conscious even when they are verbally expressed. So getting these states to be conscious requires more than just their being expressed in words. As noted earlier, this is relevant to understanding the therapeutic benefit of psychoanalytic and related treatments. Simply giving verbal expression to our affective states need not produce therapeutic results. To make our affective states conscious, we must report—that is, we must explicitly describe and talk about—those states.

Indeed, simply expressing one's affective states in words may actually interfere with those states' coming to be conscious. Suppose I express my anger by saying that what you did was uncalled for. I may regard my remark as no more than a dispassionate comment about your behavior, and my seeing my remark that way may lead me to be reluctant to regard what I said as expressing my anger at you. This is especially likely since such remarks will invariably seem to express thoughts, whether or not we are also conscious of them as expressing an emotion. My interpretation of my state of mind, embodied in the HOT that I hold a certain dispassionate judgment about your behavior, may keep me from acknowledging,
and hence from being conscious of, the way I feel about that behavior. For that reason, bracketing moral and other evaluative considerations can sometimes facilitate one's becoming aware of one's own affective states.

V. PARAPRAXIS AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Let me conclude by briefly applying these results to the phenomenon of parapraxis. I have said that verbally expressing our thoughts is enough for those thoughts to be conscious. But don't our verbal remarks in parapraxis express unconscious thoughts, thoughts of which we are not aware? I would argue not. For one thing, the states my verbal slips reveal are seldom cognitive states; normally they are affective states. The latent content of one's speech performance in these cases is one's anger or desire, not some latent belief about things.

Perhaps, however, such slips do sometimes reveal cognitive states. Perhaps an unintended word intrudes into my saying something, revealing some unconscious thought or belief. But when this does happen, the intrusion of that word is best construed not as an integral part of what I am saying, but as a piece of nonverbal behavior. The intrusive word reveals my unconscious thought much as that thought might be revealed by my tone of voice or other aspects of how I make the relevant utterance. As noted earlier, the way we say things often reveals thoughts without thereby verbally expressing those thoughts. The unconscious latent thought in these cases is an internal causal factor that interferes with the seamless expression of my conscious thought, much as such a thought might unconsciously affect my nonverbal behavior.

One might urge, however, that the speaker's latent thought is expressed not just by the intrusion of a single word, but by the entire speech performance. Consider Freud's frequently cited case, in which the president of the Lower House of the Austrian Parliament said "I... declare the sitting closed," rather than open. A plausible interpretation of this situation is that the president had an unconscious intention to close the meeting. And, since the content of that intention matches exactly the content of the actual speech performance, it may seem plausible to suppose that this speech performance expresses the corresponding unconscious intention.

But this interpretation is untenable. The president plainly also had a conscious intention to open the meeting. And, if we see the entire utterance as expressing a latent intention to close the meeting, we cannot explain the connection between that speech performance and the corresponding conscious intention. We can do full justice to the situation only by construing the full speech performance as expressing that conscious intention. The latent intention to close the meeting—or, better, the latent wish not to have it open—exploits the expression in speech of the conscious intention, by injecting the word, 'closed'. It is only that single word that reveals, and therefore expresses, the unconscious intention. The slips of parapraxis do not undermine the generalization that all verbally expressed cognitive states are conscious.

Accordingly, the HOT model does well in explaining the things that need
explaining. It explains why some cognitive and affective states are conscious, given that it is not in their nature to be conscious. And it also explains why conscious states, both affective and cognitive, are just the states we can spontaneously tell others about. Further, the model explains why verbally expressing cognitive states suffices for those states to be conscious, whereas this is not so for affective states. We can conclude that the model provides a promising framework for further research.24

NOTES

2. Because the minor exception to this generalization does not affect the contrast drawn here between cognitive states and the emotions, I shall usually not remark on it. See, however, note 16, below.
9. One might urge that such qualities do occur, though we are not conscious of them. But when we introspect our mental states, we are conscious of being conscious of those states, and even then we are conscious of no quality belonging to our consciousness of those states. The only qualities we are conscious of are qualities of the states themselves.

Psychoanalytic clinicians might urge that there is sometimes an affective quality to the way we are conscious of our psychological states, but these cases are better explained as conscious affects associated with certain states’ coming to be conscious.

14. Freud called such cognitive states mental acts: "[A]ll the categories which we employ to describe conscious mental acts, such as ideas, purposes, resolutions, and so on, can be applied" equally well to unconscious mental states. Indeed, he continued, "the only way in which" many of "these latent [i.e., unconscious] states differ from conscious ones... precisely in the..."


16. The exception concerns the verbal expression of HOTS themselves. On that exception, see my "Why Are Verbally Expressed Thoughts Conscious?" Report No. 32/1990, Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF), Universität Bielefeld, to appear in my Consciousness and Mind.

17. An exception might be gratitude, which I can express by saying "Thank you."

18. See my "Intentionality," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10 (1986): 151–84; to be reprinted, with postscript, in Consciousness and Mind.

19. It is in any case likely that the logical empiricists' contrast between cognitive emotive significance relied on a false assimilation of the emotions to bodily sensations such as pain, since the term 'feeling' applies to both.

20. Often in this kind of case the thought is conscious; but it need not always be.

21. Thus we must take care to distinguish between what thought a speech act expresses and the various other thoughts that figure in its production. One factor to consider is the speaker's own point of view. When the latent thought is actually unconscious, the speaker will take the relevant speech performance to express the corresponding conscious thought, not the latent thought. Even when a suitable explanation of the slip is tendered, the speaker standardly feels as though the latent thought distorted the attempt to express verbally the manifest thought.

But there are more decisive considerations. Take a simple case: A speaker says "That was bad," where "That was nice" would have been socially appropriate. And the speaker avows having at that time thought only that it was nice; i.e., the speaker's thought that it was bad was, at the time, wholly unconscious. In what aspect of the speech performance does the parapraxis consist? If one says the parapraxis is the whole utterance, "That was bad," it may be tempting to conclude that the speech act expresses the unconscious thought that it was bad. But that construal does not do justice to the situation. The speaker meant, in some sense, to say "That was nice"; so the speech act as a whole must be connected with that conscious, if self-deceptive, thought. The parapraxis consists not in the speaker's overall speech performance, but in the unintended (i.e., consciously unintended) intrusion of the word 'bad' into that speech performance.


23. Freud correctly notes that "there can be no doubt that what the President intended to say was 'opened'" ("Some Elementary Lessons," Standard Edition, XXIII: 279–86, p. 284).

24. An earlier draft of this paper was read to the Division of Psychoanalysis (39) of the American Psychological Association. April 1996. I am grateful for useful discussion at that meeting.