crudest sketch of a view, and it might be that any attempt to formulate it properly yields incoherence. But if a projectivist (re-)interpretation of the folk’s application of material-substance concepts to the world can be satisfactorily developed along anything like these lines, then the folk need be guilty of no error in applying material-substance concepts. Indeed, naturalists can apply such concepts too, despite their denial of the existence of material substances. (Thanks to Peter Markie, Matt McGrath, Alan Sidelle, and especially Michael Rea for helpful comments on earlier drafts.)

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The focus of Mark Rowlands’s admirable, richly argued book is phenomenal consciousness, in particular, how such consciousness arises from processes that are not themselves phenomenally conscious. Rowlands examines several views on this question, arguing that their failures point toward his own intriguing, novel position, which he develops in the final three chapters.

After an initial introductory chapter, Rowlands examines, in chapters two and three, arguments by David Chalmers and Colin McGinn, respectively, for the claim that we cannot explain phenomenal consciousness by appeal to physical processes. Rowlands concludes that, at best, these arguments are not decisive. The next two chapters argue against attempts to explain consciousness by appeal to higher-order mental states. Chapter four focuses on the higher-order-perception view of William G. Lycan and D. M. Armstrong, and chapter five considers appeals to higher-order thoughts (HOTs) made independently by Peter Carruthers and by me.

As Rowlands notes, the explanations Chalmers and McGinn reject differ in a strategic way from these higher-order theories. Chalmers and McGinn argue against explaining phenomenal consciousness by appeal to processes that are themselves neither mental nor conscious. Higher-order theories, by contrast, seek to explain consciousness by way of phenomena that, though not conscious, are nonetheless mental.

The central difficulty with higher-order explanations, Rowlands argues, is that they misconstrue the phenomenal aspect of conscious experiences as an object of consciousness—something we’re conscious of. Rowlands calls such explanations objectualist. A correct explanation he insists, must instead see phenomenal consciousness as a feature of acts of consciousness, not as something we’re conscious of; he characterizes such explanations as actualist. Row-
lands develops the contrast between actualist and objectualist explanations in chapter six, and argues in chapters seven and eight against objectualism. Chapter nine argues for Rowlands's actualist position and against the somewhat similar representationalism of writers such as Michael Tye and Fred Dretske, and the closing chapter considers various implications of the actualist view.

The contrast between objectualist views and Rowlands's actualism is pivotal to the structure of the book. So, after briefly considering Rowlands's discussion of Chalmers and McGinn, I'll examine some general considerations he advances in support of actualism. I'll conclude with some remarks about Rowlands's case against higher-order theories, which he rightly sees as the clearest cases of objectualism.

Chalmers notoriously argues that explaining phenomenal consciousness solely in terms of non-mental, physical phenomena requires that phenomenal consciousness supervenes logically on those physical phenomena. Rowlands urges that Chalmers's description of such logical supervenience is equivocal between an epistemological and an ontological reading. Rowlands further argues that on the epistemological construal, logical supervenience isn't required for reductive explanation, as typical cases of explanatory reduction in the sciences show. And he urges that we have no reason to think that logical supervenience fails when construed ontologically.

I am not persuaded that Chalmers's text supports Rowlands's claim of equivocation. But Chalmers's text aside, the upshot of Rowlands's argument is that, given any type of supervenience that unproblematically holds between higher- and lower-level sciences, we have no reason to think that phenomenal consciousness doesn't supervene on some non-mental, physical base. His arguments for this are telling and largely convincing. I also find compelling Rowlands's argument in chapter three that an accurate account of explanatory adequacy will very likely undermine McGinn's claim that we are so constituted as to be unable to understand how consciousness arises from brain processes.

The core of Rowlands's argument for actualism and against objectualism rests on his view about the structure of phenomenal consciousness. When one consciously feels pain, for example, one's consciousness is directed, he urges, not toward the terrible feeling that is constitutive of what it's like for one to be in pain, but rather toward some bodily damage, though not necessarily as such. The terrible feeling consists not in something that one is conscious of, nor in the way one is conscious of something, but rather in the very act of directing one's consciousness toward some object. As Rowlands notes, this claim echoes Dretske's representationalist view in 'Conscious Experience' (Mind, 102, 1993, pp. 263–83) and subsequent works.

According to Rowlands, 'the what it is like of conscious experience is what, phenomenologically speaking, reveals to us the objects of our awareness in the way they are revealed' (p. 139). It is a feature of that act of awareness. But when I consciously see a red object, its being like something for me to see red
involves more than my simply being conscious of the red object; I am also con-
sscious of seeing something red. I am aware of myself as having a certain type of
visual experience.

Being aware of oneself in this way becomes explicit when we introspect our
conscious states. Introspecting involves focusing attentively on ourselves as
being in states that have particular properties. But even when we are not intro-
specting, we are still conscious of what it's like for us to be in whatever con-
scious qualitative states we are in. Whenever I consciously feel pain or see
something red, I can readily describe what it's like for me to do so, and my
ability to say what it's like requires no introspective focusing. That ability is a
function solely of my ordinary non-introspective awareness of what it's like for
me. There being something it's like for me to see something red involves
awareness both of the object and of my being visually aware of that object.

Rowlands argues in chapter seven that there are two ways we can under-
stand what it is for a state to have ‘the phenomenal property of being $P$’
(p. 154): either as the state's really being $P$ or as its simply appearing to be $P$.
And the second construal, he maintains, isn't open to objectualism. One might
be conscious of some property that a state actually has, but one cannot be con-
scious of ‘the property of appearing to be $P$’ (p. 155).

But the first construal, Rowlands insists, is unacceptable since it implies
that, if a state has the phenomenal property of being red, that state really is red.
And it's plain that it's only the object one sees that's red, not the state in virtue
of which one sees it. Objectualism about phenomenal consciousness, he con-
cludes, trades on a faulty construal of the phenomenal properties of conscious
qualitative states.

This is far too quick. Consciously seeing something red consists in one's
being in a state with some property in virtue of which one sees the thing as
being red. It is natural to take ‘red’ in an extended way to describe that state;
we speak of a sensation or experience of red, or simply of a red sensation. Sen-
sations are not, of course, red in the way that physical objects are. But we can
understand the property of mental red as occupying the same place in a family
of mental colour properties as the red of physical objects occupies in the family
of perceptible colour properties. A state with the mental property of red
resembles and di differs from other mental colour properties in ways homomor-
phic to the ways physical red itself resembles and differs from other perceptible
colours. (For more, see my ‘The Colors and Shapes of Visual Experiences’, in
Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of
Attribution, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999, pp. 95–118; and ‘Sensory Quality and the

These similarities and differences will reflect our common-sense taxono-
 mies of perceptible properties, since the taxonomy of psychophysics would
deliver the wrong results. But refinements aside, the upshot is that there are
two sets of properties: the perceptible properties of physical objects and the
distinct mental properties of the states in virtue of which we perceive those
physical objects. Our use of the same terms to refer to both the physical properties and the corresponding mental qualities may obscure that these are distinct types of property. We describe as red the perceptual states in virtue of which we see objects as red, but these aren’t the same property of being red. Rowlands wrongly assumes that the properties of qualitative states that objectualism claims we are conscious of are the same as the perceptible properties of physical objects.

Rowlands urges later in chapter seven that, even when we introspectively scrutinize our experiences, we are aware only of the objects of those experiences; introspecting never seems to generate new qualities. And he argues that this representationalist claim shows that we are not conscious of the phenomenal properties of our experiences.

But being conscious of something is always being conscious of it as being of a particular type. I can be conscious of the quality red as a property of a perceived object, as I am when I experience that object. But I can also be aware of the red quality that’s present to me as a property of my experience. That is arguably what happens when one focuses introspectively on what it’s like for one to experience things; when one introspects, one is conscious of being in a state that has the mental quality on which one introspectively focuses. Two properties always figure in perceiving, a perceptible physical property and a mental quality. And one can be explicitly conscious of either or both, depending on how the content of one’s consciousness construes its object. Nothing prevents us from being conscious of qualities present to us as the phenomenal properties of our experiences, as the properties, that is, in virtue of which we experience things as we do.

Rowlands notes in chapter eight that objectualism implies that error is possible about how conscious experiences seem to one; if we are actually conscious of phenomenal properties, the way we are conscious of them can go wrong. But no such error is possible, he insists, since we cannot distinguish the reality of conscious experiences from their appearance. Experiences, he argues, simply are appearances, and the only reality available to contrast them with are the subpersonal mechanisms that subserve those experiences. Possibly for this reason, Rowlands speaks of ‘the very appearance/reality distinction that defenders of phenomenal consciousness will reject’ (p. 21), as though simply countenancing that distinction by itself constitutes a rejection of phenomenal consciousness.

Rowlands takes Daniel C. Dennett to task for countenancing a distinction between the appearance and the reality of experiences. But Dennett’s view on this question is in fact quite close to Rowlands’s. Dennett denies that we can make sense of ‘the objectively subjective—the way things actually, objectively seem to you even if they don’t seem to seem that way to you’ (Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown, 1991, p. 132). The way things seem can be inaccurate only relative to the subpersonal occurrences that Dennett calls events of content fixation.
But, Rowlands about Dennett’s view to one side, experiential appearances are themselves features of reality, and we can be mistaken about what their mental natures are. Suppose I consciously see something red. If I do not focus attentively, I may be conscious of that colour simply as a relatively non-descriptive, generic red. I’ll then be conscious of myself as experiencing something only in that generic way. Focusing on the object’s colour, however, may result in my becoming aware of my experience in a more fine-grained way, say, as an experience of scarlet or crimson. Such attentiveness reveals something real about the experience that hadn’t figured in the way the experience previously appeared to me. The new reality I become aware of, moreover, is a matter of the mental nature of the experience, not something about subpersonal mechanisms. Such disparities between my experience and how it appears to me make room for the possibility of substantive error about that mental nature.

Since higher-order explanations are paradigmatic objectualist theories, Rowlands finds support for actualism in the failures he sees in higher-order explanations. So it is important to assess those putative failures.

Rowlands finds ‘compelling’ (p. 19) several quick arguments against higher-order theories. Armstrong and Lycan describe the higher-order states they invoke as scanning their targets. But such scanning arguably is not enough for those mental targets to be conscious, since simple computers often scan their own states without those states thereby becoming conscious. But appeal to such scanning is metaphorical; the higher-order states such theories invoke are higher-order mental states that make one conscious of their targets. And there is no reason to suppose that any scanning by present-day computers involves mental states.

It is sometimes objected against the HOT theory that, since non-human animals and human infants have no thoughts, or at most conceptually primitive thoughts, their mental states would on that theory never be conscious. But it is far from obvious that they do not have thoughts and, as I have argued elsewhere, the conceptual resources HOTs require are minimal.

These are not Rowlands’s reasons for rejecting higher-order theories. Their central shortcoming, he urges, is rather their assumption of a certain ‘independence condition’ (p. 82), on which the occurrence of a mental state is independent of its being conscious—indeed, that is, of one’s being conscious of that state.

Rowlands argues at length against this independence condition. Thus he insists that evidence that seems to support the occurrence of qualitative states of which one is in no way conscious actually supports only the occurrence of non-qualitative surrogates. Such a move is always open, but it often strains credibility. Somebody who is limping may be conscious of neither the limping nor of anything painful, but on having the limping pointed out, the person may become aware of a pain. It is natural to suppose that the pain existed even before the person became aware of it; to insist otherwise without substantial independent argument simply begs the question at issue. It does not help to
note, with Rowlands, that we speak of pains as feelings and that feelings are automatically conscious. The question is whether states occur with all the mental nature of conscious pains except for being conscious, however we might describe those states.

Rowlands supports his view by an ingenious argument of Sydney Shoemaker’s. Mental states all have characteristic causal connections with other mental states. And perhaps it is central to a mental state’s being of a particular type that it causes one to believe that one is in that state. If so, no state of that type could occur without one’s being conscious of being in it. No state could be a pain if one isn’t conscious of it; more generally, the independence condition would then fail. (See Shoemaker, “Self-Knowledge and ‘Inner Sense’”, in his The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 201–68.)

This argument rests on a rather special view about what functionalist connections are central to each mental state’s being of its particular mental type. Only if it is central to the functional role of pains that they cause one to be aware of it will it be impossible for a pain to occur that one isn’t conscious of.

But it is hard to see why that causal tie would be all that central. Every type of mental state has many characteristic causal connections, which together serve to distinguish that state both from other sorts of mental states and from non-mental states generally. A state’s causing a belief about it is never needed to distinguish it from other sorts of state. Rowlands’s arguments to the contrary all simply echo his question-begging assertion that if one is not aware of it, it is not a pain.

As Rowlands notes, higher-order theories allow that one might be conscious of oneself as being in a state that one is not actually in. What it is like for one is solely a function of how one is conscious of oneself; so consciousness can’t go wrong about what it’s like for one. But, just as we sometimes have evidence that somebody is in a state the person isn’t at all aware of, so we sometimes also have evidence that one is not in a state that one is conscious of oneself as being in. Dental patients, for example, sometimes seem to feel pain despite there being no relevant nerve; the best explanation is that they experience their anxiety and the vibration from the drill as being pain.

On higher-order theories, we are conscious of our conscious states by way of distinct higher-order states. Rowlands urges instead a model on which the higher-order content is internal to the state itself, which he calls transcendental apperception. But one state cannot have two distinct mental attitudes, and though the higher-order attitude responsible for such apperception must be assertoric, the target attitude often won’t be.

Rowlands sees the HOT theory as at least partly a conceptual assertion, though I for one have explicitly insisted on its purely empirical status. In support of his construal, he appeals to my claim that an informative, non-circular explanation might not be possible if being conscious were an intrinsic property of mental states. Rowlands construes the relevant circularity as a concep-
Rowlands argues that HOTs would themselves have to be conscious to ‘bestow’ (p. 78) consciousness on their targets. But HOTs aren’t in that way sources of consciousness. Having a HOT doesn’t alter that target state itself; it simply makes one conscious of oneself as being in the target state. Rowlands urges, however, that a non-conscious HOT wouldn’t even do that, since non-conscious thoughts don’t make one conscious of anything. But non-conscious states do make us conscious of the things they represent. When I respond to something I subliminally see, that’s because my seeing it made me conscious of it, even though I wasn’t aware of being conscious of it. Similarly, a non-conscious thought of something as being present will make one conscious of that thing, as behaviour sometimes reveals. Folk psychology is slightly awkward with these kinds of case, but they plainly do occur.

Rowlands claims that higher-order theories are not meant to apply to phenomenal consciousness. But that is at best misleading. When Lycan and I urge that qualitative character is distinct from state consciousness, that’s not because we think there’s anything about consciousness that our higher-order theories don’t explain. It is rather because qualitative states occur of which we aren’t conscious. And no qualitative state counts intuitively as being conscious if one is in no way conscious of it, since there is then nothing that it is like for one to be in that state.

These points aside, can higher-order theories explain what it’s like for one to be in conscious qualitative states? Higher-order perceiving would arguably help only if such states were conscious and so could contribute their conscious qualitative character. But then we would need in turn to explain the conscious qualitative character of those conscious higher-order perceptions.

But there is reason to think that HOTs do help. As noted earlier, we can be conscious of our sensations of red in more or less fine-grained ways. The best explanation of these variations in how we’re conscious of our qualitative states is that we are conscious of them by way of states with more or less fine-grained intentional content. So intentional states, and hence HOTs, can make a difference to what it’s like for one to be in conscious qualitative states. And HOTs should then be able to make the difference also between there being something it’s like for one to be in a qualitative state and there being nothing it’s like for one.

Rowlands’s book advances a highly challenging alternative to the standard views about phenomenal consciousness, which he supports by extensive, thoughtful argument. This is a book that anybody interested in consciousness and qualitative character will want to read.

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For thirty years Robert Solomon has been in the thick of discussions about the nature and import of human emotions and was one of the earliest revivers of the Stoic thesis that emotions are a kind of judgements. He paired this thesis with the claim, following Sartre, that we are responsible for our emotions because we choose them as devices of subjective and social strategies. The present book collects writings spanning 1973–2001. In the later essays Solomon examines his earlier views in the light of recent emotions research and direct criticisms of his own writings, disowning some while redefining and staunchly defending others. But he also addresses some new topics, tossing winsome little monkey wrenches into the reductive simplifications of social scientists.

In a 2001 paper called ‘Against Valence,’ he shows that any schema in which emotions are reduced to a neat division of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ will distort the phenomena. Emotions are negative and positive, all right, but Solomon lists seventeen ways in which these can mix in an irregular variety of ways. Is anger positive or negative? If ‘positive’ means ‘pleasant,’ then many an instance of anger is both positive and negative; if ‘positive’ means ‘morally right,’ then some anger is positive, some negative, some maybe both; if it means ‘approving of the object’ (of the emotion), then whether anger is positive depends on which part of the object one has in mind (emotional objects are usually situational)—if the ‘object’ is the agent one is angry at, then negative, if it is the victim of the offence, then positive; if ‘positive’ means ‘healthy,’ then again some anger is positive, some negative.

In ‘Back to Basics’ (1993, 2001) Solomon takes apart the concept of ‘basic’ emotions so dear to certain physiologically oriented psychologists, but also used, for different reasons, by philosophers across the ages. Paul Ekman judges emotions to be basic if they have a distinct facial expression as carefully measured by patterns of muscular contraction, correlated with a (somewhat speculative) substratum of neurological activity and a (very speculative) evolutionary history. But the dubiousness of the inference from sameness of expression to sameness of emotion casts doubt on whether what is being called ‘basic’ here is even emotions. Cannot the same smile express many different emotions, in contexts—not only variants of joy, say (gratitude, hopefulness, pleasant surprise, Schadenfreude, rapture, amusement, pride, and so on), but rather different ones such as fondness, thrill, and embarrassment? Solomon thinks the notion of basic emotions ‘is neither meaningless nor so straightforward as its critics and defenders respectively argue, but it is historical and cul-