for a general truth. But then, of course, unrestricted universal elimination (Quine's "universal instantiation") is not a rule that is strictly faithful to the sense of that quantifier. Perhaps when the intuitionist's conception is extended beyond mathematics, he must be prepared for the possibility that no quantifier of his can stand to the classical realist's universal quantifier as the intuitionistic universal quantifier in arithmetic stands to the classical one there.

VIII

My final observation on the general criterion for logical-constancy is to observe how it can help to explain the plausibility of the operation of the Principle of Charity in a way that (at least) guarantees that there will be no assent to the negations of certain uncontroversial logical truths. For the logical constants, the Principle of Charity involves identifying where we can as negation, conjunction, . . ., devices of another language on the basis solely of the conditions under which wholes containing these devices are assented to or dissented from by speakers of the other language on the basis of assent or dissent to the expressions on which they operate. Now if, given knowledge of the satisfaction conditions of $\alpha$, one cannot tell a priori whether or not $\alpha(\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_n)$ is satisfied by a sequence on the basis of which sequences satisfy $\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_n$, then assent or dissent to $\alpha(\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_n)$ will not depend solely on assent and dissent patterns to $\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_n$: it will depend also on the way the world is (or is believed to be). We can expect our predictions about assent and dissent to be wrong in empirically possible cases if we apply Charity in the form both Quine and Davidson envisage for the logical constants, to an expression that is not on our criterion a logical constant. I conclude that, in this particular case, as perhaps elsewhere, Charity and Constancy are inseparable.

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BOOK REVIEWS


Vendler's principal goal in this book is to develop and defend a systematic and predominantly rationalist account of speech and thought, and of the relationship between them. Central to rational-
ism, as Vendler conceives it, is "the commonsense view that speech is essentially the expression of thought" (28), and part of what he takes this to involve is that both thinking and speaking are propositional in nature. The empiricist theories that he rejects, by contrast, typically conceive of thinking nonpropositionally, as being, for example, "nothing but a series of mental images, subvocal talk, or a pattern of overt behavior" (80; cf. 2, 40, 123). Vendler argues that any such view of the nature of thinking faces insurmountable difficulties in giving a correct account of the relationship of speech to thought; for,

... the full analysis of the notions of saying something and understanding what one said inevitably involves a concept which ... essentially corresponds to the Cartesian idea of thought and thinking (4).

Vendler's most striking tool in arriving at an analysis of these notions is his examination of the grammatical properties of constructions that occur in reports of people's speech and thought. He appeals heavily to such properties in two largely independent contexts. In chapters II and III, he uses them to argue for "the identity of what can be thought and what can be said" (52), hoping thereby to support his view that "speech [is], essentially and by definition, ... the expression of thought" (1). Then, in chapter V, he adduces new grammatical considerations to establish the claim that the objects of belief are not the same as those of knowledge. Vendler believes that this is crucial to his elaboration and defense of "the Cartesian idea of thought and thinking" (4).

Vendler distinguishes a "weak" from a "full" sense of 'say'; the "weak sense of saying is roughly equivalent to uttering, mouthing, or pronouncing" (25), while "[t]o say something in the full sense is to perform an illocutionary act" (53). The indirect-discourse construction serves to discriminate the two; whereas indirect quotation cannot reproduce what is said in the weak sense (53), "to perform an illocutionary act is to license" the indirect reproduction of what one says (61). Since Vendler's analysis focuses on the full sense, chapter II ("On Saying Something") begins with an attempt to determine the nature of illocutionary acts. Refining and building on material from his earlier *Linguistics in Philosophy*, Vendler proposes a grammatical test to separate performative from psycho-

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1 Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1967, chs. 4 and 5; henceforth *LP*. Vendler's grammatical discussions follow the work of Zellig Harris, and his transformational analyses therefore sometimes diverge from those of Noam Chomsky and his followers, for example, with respect to the recoverability of deletion. These matters will not be discussed here.
logical verbs. Other grammatical properties serve, he claims, to distinguish three kinds of psychological verb, those of "mental state" and of "mental act," which, like performative verbs, are propositional, and a third sort, exemplified by 'observe', which is not. Vendler then proceeds to construct a detailed and impressive taxonomy of speech acts, mental acts, and mental states, relying on the grammatical form of the sentence nominalizations that the various verbs can take as objects. In chapter II, he distinguishes seven types of nominal, showing that the performative verbs in each group correspond to Austin's intuitive semantic classification, slightly refined. In chapter III ("Thought"), he classifies verbs of mental act and state on this same principle, showing that the mental verbs that take a given form of nominal also resemble one another semantically, and that these similarities extend across the lines separating speech acts, mental acts, and mental states.

The results of this taxonomy are generally convincing, and the method of attending to forms of nominals is clearly fruitful and suggestive. And Vendler's initial way of distinguishing nonpropositional mental verbs from those of speech act and of mental act and state, which also relies on forms of nominals, is compelling as well. But when Vendler turns to distinguishing performative verbs from verbs of mental act and state, he depends not on embedded nominals but on what he elsewhere calls the "time schemata" (LP, ch. 4) of the verbs themselves. Here his discussion is less persuasive. Whereas verbs of observation express present time by the present continuous tense, Vendler claims that all propositional verbs resist this construction in the first-person singular. Performatives, he urges, do use the first-person present nonprogressive to indicate a present moment; verbs of mental state ('believe', 'know') use this form to indicate a span of time that includes the present; and verbs of mental act ('decide', 'discover') resemble performatives in speaking of a moment of "achievement," but never in the first-person singular present nonprogressive. But not all verbs of mental state

2 Vendler distinguishes "perfect" from "imperfect" nominals. The former (such as 'George's singing the song' and 'that George sings'), like verbs, can be modified by tenses, adverbs, auxiliaries, and negation. The latter (George's singing of the song', 'the singing') resemble nouns in being modified instead by prenominal adjectives, articles, relative clauses, and prepositional phrases, especially the objective genitive. (See LP, 127-131.) According to Vendler, perfect nominals denote temporal entities such as events, and mental verbs governing them pertain not to thinking but to observation and related nonpropositional activities (see LP, 102). By contrast, all other mental verbs that govern nominals (verbs of sensation, for example, do not) and all performatives govern imperfect nominals; Vendler claims that these nominals express propositions rather than denoting events or similar entities.
or act do reject the first-person continuous present. Among the latter, 'decide' and 'realize' use that tense, with the rough sense of 'coming to decide (realize)'; among the former, 'hope' and 'expect' use both the continuous and noncontinuous present roughly interchangeably, though perhaps with distinguishable connotations. More important, one can ask 'At what moment did you recall (suspect, deem) that such-and-such?’, though Vendler takes the possibility of this question as definitive of the “time schema” of performatives as against those of mental state (14). Austin’s less systematic criteria for performatives, such as the ‘I hereby …’ rubric, duly reject these and all other verbs of mental act and state. Vendler is more successful in showing the parallels between verbs of thought and speech than in capturing their differences.

Because the constructions that can serve as complements of performative verbs and of verbs of mental state and act are the same (except with verbs like ‘order’ and ‘appoint’ to which no mental verbs correspond), Vendler concludes that there is an “almost universal identity of the objects of speech and thought” (36). Taking ‘say’ in the full sense as “a sort of general performative” (25) and, similarly, ‘think’ as a generic verb for the various mental acts and states (cf. 198, and *LP*), Vendler urges that his grammatical results show that “you can say whatever you think, and you can think almost [see the above exception] whatever you can say” (36, emphasis original). If Vendler’s claim “that speech is essentially the expression of thought” (28) amounts simply to this, he has established that much of his rationalist thesis.

By itself, however, all that this identity of possible propositional objects shows is that speech acts, like mental states and acts, have propositional content. One can put this by saying that speech acts express propositions, and since we often use ‘thought’ interchangeably with ‘proposition’, one can equally well say that speech acts express thoughts. But the traditional idea that speech is the expression of thought also implies some direct connection between speaking and thinking, indeed, a connection between speech acts and mental states or acts with the same propositional content. And it implies that thinking is somehow conceptually prior to speech. The fact that speech and thinking share propositional objects does little to support these latter ideas. No help is got from Vendler’s impressive demonstration that semantically similar verbs of speech and thought govern syntactically parallel nominals. For even if the proposition that a speech act expresses always corresponds to the proposition involved in a particular sort of mental act or state,
what a speech act expresses may be nothing that the speaker thinks or believes; exactly this occurs in insincere speech.³

Part of the traditional view does get support from Vendler’s argument in chapter IV ("Propositions") that understanding what is said involves some mental state with the same propositional content as the target speech act, and that saying something requires that one intend "to achieve ... [some] illocutionary aim" (64).⁴ For these points tend to substantiate a conceptual primacy of thinking over speech, as does Vendler’s observation that "[w]hat people state is often something they believe, ... and, even if not, it must normally be something they want the listener to believe" (67). Still, these arguments, which proceed independently of Vendler’s grammatical results, do little to make plausible the idea that speech acts express particular mental states or acts.

Vendler’s discussion sometimes seems unclear about the difference between thinking and its propositional content. This encourages the appearance that he has shown that speech acts express not only propositions but also mental acts and states, and it makes it difficult to know which position Vendler wants to establish. For example, in endorsing Descartes’s claim that "[t]he relation between the exercise of real speech (vera loquela) and the presence of thought is a necessary one" (179), Vendler leaves it unclear whether he is using ‘thought’ with his explicitly preferred sense, as equivalent to "the object of a mental act or state" (53; cf. 39), or as equivalent to ‘mental act or state’; the context suggests both. Words like ‘belief’ and ‘suspicion’, moreover, can denote either a mental state or the propositional content of one.⁵ But Vendler does not always keep these senses clearly separate, writing, for example, of beliefs and suspicions in successive sentences first as thoughts and then as mental states (44). And in expounding a view of Descartes’s that he endorses, Vendler states that mental acts are ideas (193), that ideas are thoughts (194), and that ideas are the propositional

³ Vendler in effect concedes this; "[w]hat is said, if said with meaning and not merely parrotwise, is a thought, but it may not be the real thought of the speaker" (37).

⁴ I owe this idea to Stanley Munsat.

⁵ On Vendler’s test, such words are perfect nominals; but although such nominals normally denote eventlike entities, in this case states, Vendler maintains that, when embedded in contexts pertaining to propositions, perfect nominals take on the sense of imperfect nominals (LP, 132, 140). In writing that “a mental state normally has an effect on what people do or say” (44), Vendler acknowledges that mental states are eventlike; for on his view, while facts, which are propositional, are the entities that cause things, only eventlike entities can have (or be) effects [LP, ch. 6; “Causal Relations,” this JOURNAL, LXIV, 21 (Nov. 9, 1967), 704–713].
objects of thinking to which is added some "mental frame" analogous to an illocutionary force (167/8; cf. 137).

Vendler also has little clear to say about the nature of mental states and acts themselves, beyond their having propositional content. A proposition, he writes, can "be entertained, in the form of a thought, in a variety of mental acts and mental states" (68), and a proposition can be "entertained in a certain mental frame," just as it can be "issued with a certain illocutionary force" (137) in speech act. And in elaborating an account of the mind, he claims "that it is the 'I' itself that supplies the particular force to all the mental acts" (169). These remarks encourage the idea that mental acts and states are propositions together with some "mental frame" or other. Vendler's insistence that "whereas speech is the expression of thought in a code . . . thought is not an expression of anything and is not conceived in a code or via a code" (42, italics original) also suggests this picture. For if thinking involves no "mental 'medium' " (44) in the way that speaking involves words, it seems to follow that nothing in a mental state or act could carry its propositional content except a constituent proposition itself. If this is Vendler's view, the fact that speech acts express propositions would result in a kind of connection between speech acts and mental acts and states with the same propositional content. But since propositions are abstract entities and mental states and acts are concrete and occurrent, the claim that the former are elements of the latter would again suggest that the two are being conflated. (Vendler does maintain that occurrent mental images are constituents of many propositions, but not of all.) Moreover, when Vendler later writes that "[w]e have seen in Chapter III that all thoughts are tied to the subject via the mental frames (mental acts or states) in which one entertains propositions" (161), this supports the different picture that mental acts and states are no more than "mental frames." And one can read the first several quotations of this paragraph so that they too suggest this second possibility. Vendler's account of mental states and acts remains somewhat obscure and elusive, in part because of his continued reliance on metaphor. More important, to the extent to which we must understand "mental frames" on the analogy with illocutionary forces, this undermines the rationalist doctrine of the conceptual primacy of thinking over speech.

In much of chapter iv and all of chapter v ("On What One Knows"), Vendler develops an elaborate contrast between propositions as subjective entities and the objective entities he calls "facts"
and "possibilities." He argues that, whereas the objects of belief and many other mental states and acts are propositions, the objects of knowledge are facts; what can be known is different from what can be believed. When we report the propositional content of a speech act in indirect discourse, we must change some words that were actually used, such as token-reflexives and words involving tense; other changes are optional, subject to semantic equivalence. But Vendler maintains that changes of some coreferential referring expressions, particularly names but also descriptions, may result in a nominal that expresses a different proposition. If one is ignorant of the relevant identity, one's belief or assertion that Cicero denounced Cataline has a different propositional content from one's belief or assertion that Tully did. "People speak about [concrete] individuals in certain terms because they think about them in certain ways" (72); so in reproducing the propositional content of someone's speech we must take "into consideration the speaker's mind" (72). Since propositions are thought-dependent in this way, Vendler concludes that they are "subjective entities" (72).

Whereas names, descriptions, indexicals, and "nonlinguistic media" (105; cf. 74) such as pointing determine reference in speech, Vendler claims that mental images accomplish this in our thinking. Indeed, the subjectivity of propositions results not so much from a person's "actual words ... [as] from the fact that an individual is known to a person only under some aspects" (72). (Compare Russell's epistemological doctrine that concrete individuals can be constituents of propositions.) Vendler does not make clear the relationship these referential factors bear to propositions. He writes that "[e]xperience and imagination must enter the very constitution of our thoughts involving concrete individuals" (76); if this means that mental images are merely "part of the make-up of our mental states" (77), it is not obvious that propositions themselves should be subjective, since they are simply the objects of mental states. But different "referring media" (74) discharge the same function in speech and in thinking; so if these media "enter the very constitution of" propositions themselves, then propositions expressed in thought will differ from those expressed in speech. Such subjectivity of propositions themselves would impair their role as the common objects of speech and thought.

Facts and possibilities, by contrast, are objective entities. Facts are simply possibilities that actually obtain, and possibilities are like propositions except that two nominals that differ only in containing distinct coreferential phrases, though they may express different
propositions, always mention the same possibility. In chapter v, Vendler argues forcefully for a systematic grammatical basis for this distinction. While in some contexts a ‘that’-clause can be transformed into a ‘wh’-nominal, in others this move is blocked; one can go from ‘George knows that a is F.’ to ‘George knows who (what) is F.’, but not from ‘George believes that a is F.’ to ‘George believes who (what) is F.’. And although both ‘know’ and ‘believe’ induce referential opacity, “[t]he wh-nominal transcends referential opaqueness” (115); in ‘George knows who is F.’, what is known is specified independently of how it is known. But since “[b]elieve cannot take wh-nominals” (97), one can specify what somebody believes “only in terms of the descriptions he happens to know” (80/1). Vendler hypothesizes that ‘that’-clauses in contexts that admit ‘wh’-nominals differ from those in contexts that do not. Since the former allow a transformation that “transcends referential opacity” (115), they denote objective possibilities. But those ‘that’-clauses which one cannot transform into ‘wh’-nominals are wedded to their referential opacity; hence they express subjective propositions. What one believes is a proposition; what one knows is a fact.

There is reason to doubt Vendler’s conclusion that “[t]he possibility of wh-nominalization marks the objective domain of the language” (116) in this way. If George knows that Cicero denounced Cataline and Paul knows that Tully did, and neither knows the relevant identity, they still both “know the same fact” (115), namely, who denounced Cataline. Vendler seems only partly correct that “[a] parallel move … is impossible with believe” (115). If we substitute believing for knowing in our example, we can say, transparently, that George and Paul both believe about the same person that he denounced Cataline,7 though it is not so clear that

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6 “As the proposition is abstracted from the variety of synonymous linguistic media, so facts (and possibilities) represent a further abstraction, this time from equivalent referring media” (87). Vendler rejects Russell’s idea that “a proposition … is nothing but a paraphrastic set of sentences” (65), appealing to “[t]he difficulties we encountered with the idea of thinking in words or images” (65). It would be useful to know whether he would accept the modified view that propositions are sets of both relevantly equivalent speech acts and corresponding mental acts and states, and if not, what notion of abstraction he is using here; his metaphorical remarks about abstraction (e.g., 79) provide little help.

7 Since the most salient reading of ‘George and Paul both believe about somebody that that person denounced Cataline.’ does not require that they both believe this of the same person (compare ‘George and Paul both know who …’), it is far from clear that the ‘believes about … that’ construction by itself overcomes opacity. (I owe this observation to Vendler.) Nor is there reason to think that this construction functions transformationally like the ‘wh’-nominal. Still, some variations of the construction do require a transparent reading: ‘both believe about Tully (about the same person) that …’. And to conclude that ‘be-
one can, without intolerable awkwardness, transparently specify the common object of their mental states. Vendler describes this as a case of "two persons having beliefs that [merely] mirror the same fact" (115). Vendler may be correct that we "cannot claim that ... [they] have the same belief" (115), at least not without qualification; but we also cannot say, in the corresponding case with 'know', that the two have, without qualification, the same knowledge. In the 'know' case, Vendler urges that what the two know is the same "if one focuses one's attention on the fact, the objective element, but ... not if the subjective appearance, the proposition, is considered" (84; cf. 115). But this is equally true, in the 'believe' case, of what the two believe; at most, with what is believed we may focus more strongly on the subjective, and with what is known, more strongly on the objective. Moreover, although 'wh'-nominals do function as "indefinite versions of that-clauses" (104), their operation is hardly specific to referential factors; we can say not only that George knows who denounced Cataline, but equally well that he knows what Cicero did to Cataline. Vendler rightly stresses that the possibility of 'wh'-nominalization is distinctive of so-called "factive" verbs; but the availability of this transformation draws a distinction far less sharp than the one he seeks to establish.

Vendler's argument "that know and believe cannot have identical objects at all" (99) rests on properties of constructions in which one propositional verb occurs within the scope of another. In 'George believes what Paul believes.', 'what' is a relative pronoun, and George and Paul are said to "share a set of beliefs" (111). But in 'George knows what Paul believes.', 'what' heads a 'wh'-nominal, and George is not said to know the same thing as what Paul believes, but rather that Paul believes some particular thing. So one cannot assert identical objects of knowledge and belief in this way. As for the reverse construction, Vendler argues persuasively that "that-clauses (or their pronoun substitutes) are incompatible with

8 Vendler maintains that "whenever I claim that I know wh ... [including knowing how], I guarantee that I could make another claim in which the wh-nominal is replaced by a corresponding that-clause" (104), but that many claims of knowing-that require some "means to supplement words," such as pointing or showing (104). And he urges that "[i]n view of what we discovered about the role of imagination in certain mental states ..., it is not surprising that in many cases of saying something we make use of such nonlinguistic media" (105, fn. 7). But then what is known will itself often involve images or their functional equivalent; in such a case, what is known should, on Vendler's view, be a proposition and not merely, as he claims, be "apprehended in the form of" one (84).
certain contexts as a result of their being embedded in a more immediate context" (111), and that 'believe' and 'know' provide incompatible contexts of this type. So perhaps Vendler is correct in his surprising conclusion that 'George believes what Paul knows.' is ungrammatical (112). With many factive verbs, 'George believes what Paul . . . .' does sound deviant, for example, with 'discover', 'realize', 'remind', 'learn', 'recall', and others; but it is far less obvious with 'know' itself, and 'George believes what Paul told him.' is perfectly acceptable. But even if the initial embedding of a 'that'-clause "decides its further cooccurrence restrictions and its transformational behavior with respect to the wh-nominalization" (112), it does not follow that "that-clauses can be ambiguous" (105). For, we need not suppose "that the that-clauses after know are different from the that-clauses after believe" (99), but only that 'that'-clauses together with one sort of immediate context differ from 'that'-clauses taken together with the other sort of immediate context. If so, it should be possible to circumvent Vendler's results by using constructions in which neither of the two incompatible propositional verbs falls within the scope of the other. And in fact 'What George knows is the same as what Paul believes.' is both a natural and a grammatical conclusion to draw from 'George knows that p.' together with 'Paul knows that p.'.

If "speech is essentially the expression of thought" (28), and indeed, "the expression of thought in a code" (42), the question appears to arise as to how people learn "to identify propositions in their linguistic garb" (68). Chapter VI ("Word and Concept") discusses this and related questions, and concludes that to learn language one "must have . . . a native equipment that codes the fundamental illocutionary, syntactic, and semantic features of any possible human language" (140). The idea that we learn language by the operation of such native equipment is of a piece, Vendler believes, with the idea "that a child must learn his native tongue in a way similar to the way one learns a second language" (140); "learning a specific language—whether first, second, or third—is learning a code in which to express one's thoughts and to recover the thoughts

Vendler has since noted that, whereas 'George told Paul wh- . . . .' is factive, 'George told Paul that . . . .' is not (personal communication). Vendler presumably believes that 'told' must occur in 'George believes what Paul told him.' nonfactively, so that that sentence could never be about the same object of 'tell' as, e.g., 'Paul told George where he went.' This idea may get support from the fact that 'George believes what Paul told him, namely, . . . .' sounds odd if completed by a 'wh'-nominal but not when a 'that'-clause is used. But as with 'George believes what Paul knows.', the sense of deviance here is at best marginal compared with that of, e.g., 'George believes what Paul discovered.'
of others" (142). So a person can understand what somebody else says only "because he is able to decode the message and identify the content in the familiar world of his own thoughts" (142). If this account is to avoid relying on the implausible idea that we directly apprehend abstract propositions, it must appeal to our direct knowledge of our own mental states and acts; Vendler's explanation of such knowledge, however, is far from satisfactory. Moreover, Vendler's arguments for a nativist account of learning and understanding language hinge on the familiar fact "that the learning of a word, as a meaningful element, not only presupposes the existence of a framework of thought, but also ... some command over ... the syntactic and semantic structure of a natural language" (139). But there is no reason to assume that in learning a first language one begins by using words as full-fledged units of language, any more than that one's first motions in learning to ride a bicycle or play a musical instrument are full-fledged parts of those activities. The use of words becomes the use of meaningful elements of language only gradually, as one gains command over a substantial range of linguistic forms.

In his seventh and final chapter ("Descartes' Res Cogitans"), Vendler develops a detailed and suggestive account of Descartes's views on thinking, sensation, and the mind. His interpretation of Descartes owes much to the systematic position articulated earlier in the book; many of Descartes's views turn out to be the same as Vendler's, and Vendler urges that, where they diverge, what Descartes "should have said ... had he been wholly faithful to his own principles" (4, emphasis original) often matches Vendler's position. In particular, Vendler claims that "the Cartesian concept of thought and thinking is identical with the one developed in Chapter III above" (148); his argument is brief, but convincing. But, according to Vendler, when Descartes turned to sensation, this notion of thinking as necessarily propositional was displaced, and "immediate awareness ... became Descartes' sole criterion of thought" (161). So when Descartes regards sensations, in the sense of "the immediate mental result" of bodily stimulations, as forms of thinking (151), Vendler sees only this latter criterion at work; for he believes that such sensations cannot be propositional if Descartes is to distinguish them, as he does, from sensations in the sense of judgments about external objects. But Descartes's distinction seems to be between judgments about external objects and judgments about mere bodily sensations, and both are propositional. The evidence is strong that "[i]mmediacy ... [as] Descartes' sole cri-
tion of thought" (191) does not conflict with thought's being essentially propositional, and indeed, that Descartes, unlike Vendler, simply counts nothing nonpropositional as mental.

According to Vendler, Descartes believes that "a mind is nothing but a temporally extended configuration of thoughts" (185);

And, as the res extensa is the synthesis or totality of all objects rather than a distinct substratum that underlies them, so the res cogitans is the synthesis or totality of all of one's thoughts rather than a distinct substratum in which they inhere (186).

Vendler extensively documents this novel interpretation, and argues with some force that Descartes's talk of unextended substances results solely from his misplaced and unnecessary use "of the 'substratum' model to preserve unity through change" (186).

If this doctrine, which Vendler endorses, amounts to the view that a mind is a succession of thoughts in the sense of a succession of propositions, it remains obscure what it could be for propositions to succeed one another temporally. Their subjectivity does suggest to Vendler that a mind is "individuated by the subjective perspective that marks a significant portion of one's thoughts" (195) and which is inherited from the role mental images play in propositions (cf. 85/6, 161, and 204). But although mental images do occur in temporal succession, if propositions did so as well because of their constituent mental images, one could not think the same thing about a concrete individual on distinct occasions; nor would this explain the temporal succession of propositions that are not about concrete individuals. In claiming that a mind is a temporal succession of thoughts, Vendler must be using 'thought' as equivalent not to 'proposition' but to 'mental act or state'. This makes all the more pressing the need for Vendler to give a more satisfactory account of mental acts and states than he does.

Vendler persuasively maintains that "sensations and feelings do not enter one's consciousness until by noticing or being aware of them one forms or entertains a perceptual judgment" (162). But he rejects the plausible idea that the situation is parallel with mental acts and states;10 "it is an understatement to say that the

10 Since sensations are not propositional (162), they are not "tied to the subject via the mental frames ... in which one entertains propositions" (161); by contrast, "the subject of all mental acts and states is the 'I' of the thinker" (161). Although 'I feel pain.' and 'I believe that ....' both point to such a subject, Vendler takes the availability of alternative constructions for reports of sensations ('It hurts.', 'My stomach aches.') but not for reports of mental states and acts ('My head thinks that ....') to substantiate his distinction. This observation is more compelling for bodily sensations than for perceptual sensations
mind knows its thoughts; the mind is these thoughts" (191, emphasis original). For mental acts and states "[t]o be in the mind and to be known are the same thing" (193). Vendler’s argument here relies on the idea that "to think that \( p \) and to think that one thinks that \( p \) (if we can speak of such a thing) are the same thought" (193/4), urging that the case is analogous to the redundancy of ‘I say’ in ‘I say that I order . . . .’; neither the analogy nor Vendler’s conclusion is convincing. Moreover, Vendler agrees with Descartes that there are ‘unconscious’ thoughts—that is, ideas that exist in the mind without its paying ‘attention’ to them” (190), and he explains that such unconscious thoughts “are thoughts that are not ‘actual’ in the way, say, realizations or decisions [i.e., mental acts] are actual, yet ‘exist in the mind potentially,’ inasmuch as we can become conscious of them, immediately, at will” (191). But if a mind is simply a succession of mental acts and states, it is not clear what the distinction between being actually and potentially in the mind can amount to, unless, as with sensation, to be aware of our thinking is to think about it, even if we are not fully aware, in turn, of that thinking. These difficulties suggest the influence on Vendler of “[i]mmediacy . . . [as the] sole criterion of thought” (191), for which he takes Descartes to task.

This is a challenging and rewarding book. Vendler’s grammatical discussions, especially in chapter v, are rich and suggestive, and contribute much to understanding the language we use to talk about mind and about language itself. And Vendler’s substantive position is provocative, subtle, and often convincing, though his picturesque language, while evoking analogies with the views of Descartes, Thomas, Leibniz, and Kant, sometimes impedes ready comprehension. Vendler’s book is an important one for anybody concerned with the issues he discusses.

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