

CONSCIOUSNESS

Edited by Josh Weisberg and David Rosenthal
Wiley Blackwell

I: Problems of Consciousness

1. Thomas Nagel, "What is it Like to Be a Bat?", *The Philosophical Review*, 83, 4 (October 1974).
2. Kathleen Akins, "What is it Like to Be Boring and Myopic?", in *Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind*, Bo Dahlbom, ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
3. David Chalmers, "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature," in Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield, eds., *Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind*, Blackwell, 2003.
4. Joseph Levine, "The Explanatory Gap," chapter 3 of Levine, *Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
5. Daniel Dennett, "A Third-Person Approach to Consciousness," chapter 2 of Dennett, *Sweet Dreams*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003.

II: Consciousness and Knowledge

6. Frank Jackson, "What Mary Didn't Know," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 83, 5 (May 1986).
7. Katalin Balog, "In Defense of the Phenomenal Concepts Strategy," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 84, 1 (January 2012).
8. David Lewis, "What Experience Teaches," *Proceedings of the Russellian Society* (University of Sydney) 13 (1988).

III: Qualitative Consciousness

9. Ned Block, "On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 18, 2 (June 1995).
10. Gilbert Harman, "The Intrinsic Quality of Experience," *Philosophical Perspectives*, 4 (1990).
11. David Rosenthal, "How to Think about Mental Qualities," *Philosophical Issues*, 20 (October 2010).

IV: Theories of Consciousness

12. Fred Dretske, "Conscious Experience," *Mind*, 102, 406 (April 1993).
13. Uriah Kriegel, "The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness," in Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford, eds., *Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2006.
14. Michelle Montague, "What Kind of Awareness Is Awareness of Awareness," *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 94, 3 (2017).
15. Josh Weisberg, "Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness," *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness*, ed. Uriah Kriegel, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.

V: Agency and Physicalism

16. Susanna Schellenberg, "Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity," *Noûs*, 53, 1 (March 2017).
17. Myrto Mylopoulos, "The Nature of Agentive Awareness," original for this volume.
18. Galen Strawson, "Realistic Monism," *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 13, 10–11 (2006).
19. Fiona Macpherson, "Property Dualism and the Merits of Solutions to the Mind-Body Problem," *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 13, 10–11 (2006).