Thought, Speech, and Content

THOUGHT, SPEECH, AND CONTENT

Philosophy 77100, CUNY Graduate Center Spring 2020, Room 7102, Thursday 2-4 David Rosenthal Weekly topics and readings are below. We may revise readings a bit as we go, and may skip a topic or two depending on time, or even reorder a couple of topics. This file will be available at https://tinyurl.com/tscs20, always with a revision date at the bottom. Course requirements: One paper due at the end of the semester (on a date we'll decide on later), and an abstract of your projected paper, due no later than April 23 (250 words maximum, WORD-readable email attachment—no pdfs!). Earlier is also OK! Some readings are available at URLs below; others will be available—but only briefly!— at https://tinyurl.com/tscs20-rdgs. It's a very large file (192M), and I won't keep it up past February 15. So be sure to get it by then. Many optional readings are in that file, though some just have citations indicating where they can be found. Optional readings are never necessary—they're just for follow up or exploration if you feel like it. Organization of Topics 1. Thought, Speech, and Content: Introductory 2. Content (I): Compositionality and the Language of Thought 3. Content (II): Atomism vs. Holism—The Disjunction Problem and Content Individuation 4. Content (III): Descriptivism, Direct Reference, and Twin Earth 5. Mental Attitude (I): Individuating and Embedding the Attitudes 6. Thought and Speech (I): Original and Derived Intentionality and Social Anti-Individualism 7. Thought and Speech (II): Verbal Expression, Moore's Paradox, and First-Person Access 8. Content (IV): Demonstrative Reference and the Indirect Reflexive 9. Mental Attitude (II): Volitional States and Emotions 10. Thought and Speech (III): Theory of Mind and the False-Belief Test 11. No new readings (after 2-week spring break): abstracts due on April 23 12. Thought and Speech (IV): Thought, Speech, and Consciousness 13. Content (V): Inference and Thought Processes 14. Mental Attitude (III): Relations among the Attitudes—Willing What to Think

READINGS

1. FOR 1/30: Thought, Speech, and Content: Introductory No required reading Optional: Jacob, "Intentionality," Stanford Encyclopedia 2. FOR 2/6: Content (I): Compositionality and the Language of Thought Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, ch. 1 Fodor, "Propositional Attitudes" Fodor, "Why There Still Has to Be a Language of Thought" Harman, Thought, chs. 4-5 Optional: Carey, Précis of The Origin of Concepts Carey, "Why Theories of Concepts Should Not Ignore the Problem of Acquisition" Davidson, "Theories of Truth and Learnable Languages" Frege, "On Sense and Reference" Chisholm, "Sentences about Believing" Harman, Thought, ch. 6 Davidson, "Theories of Truth and Learnable Languages" Fodor, "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology" Schiffer, "Does Mentalese Have a Compositional Semantics?", and Fodor's reply Szabó, "Compositionality," Stanford Encyclopedia Schiffer, "Intentionality and the Language of Thought" Montague, "Against Propositionalism" Grzankowski, "Attitudes towards Objects" Samuels, "Innateness in Cognitive Science" Rosenthal, "Talking about Thinking" 3. FOR 2/13: Content (II): Atomism vs. Holism—The Disjunction Problem and Content Individuation Fodor and Lepore, "Why Meaning (Probably) Isn’t Conceptual Role" Greenberg and Harman, "Conceptual Role Semantics" Lepore and Fodor, "Précis of Holism: A Shopper's Guide" Dennett, "True Believers: The Intentional Stance and Why It Works," and postscript, "Real Patterns, Deeper Facts, and Empty Questions" Lewis, "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications" Optional: Harman, Change in View, chs. 1, 6, 7, 9 Harman, "(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics" Block, "Holism, Hyper-Analyiicity and Hyper-Compositionality" Elga and Rayo, "Fragmentation and Information Access" Lepore and Fodor, "Reply to Critics" Hanks, "What are the Primary Bearers of Truth?" Boghossian, "Does an Inferential Role Semantics Rest Upon a Mistake?" Fodor and Lepore, "Reply to Block and Boghossian" Fodor, Psychosemantics, ch. 3 Block, "An Argument for Holism" Block, "Conceptual Role Semantics" Block, "Holism, Mental and Semantic" Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," §§5-6 Rosenberg, Linguistic Representation, ch. 2 Rosenthal, Consciousness and Mind, ch. 12 Devitt, "Localism and Analyticity" (commenting on Fodor and Lepore) Brandom, "The Social Anatomy of Inference" (commenting on Fodor and Lepore) Davidson, "Thought and Talk" Dennett, "Real Patterns," The Journal of Philosophy, January 1991 Field, "Mental Representation," Erkenntnis, July 1978 Brandom, Making It Explicit, ch. 2 Fodor and Lepore, "Brandom's Burdens: Compositionality and Inferentialism" Dretske, "Précis of "Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes" and "Reply to Reviewers," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, June 1990 Macdonald and Papineau, "Introduction: Prospects and Problems for Teleosemantics" Papineau, "The Status of Teleosemantics, or How to Stop Worrying about Swampman," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, July 2001 Millikan, Varieties of Meaning, ch. 11 Book Symposium on Millikan, Varieties of Meaning, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, November 2007 Wagner, "Teleosemantics and the Troubles of Naturalism," Philosophical Studies, September 1994 4. FOR 2/20: Content (III): Descriptivism, Direct Reference, and Twin Earth Frege, "On Sense and Reference" Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes" Geach, Mental Acts, §§12-15 Putnam, "Meaning and Reference" Davidson, "On Saying That" Optional: Kripke, Naming and Necessity, lecture II Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, ch. 7 Putnam, "It Ain't Necessarily So" Putnam, "Brains and Behavior" Stalnaker, "On What's in the Head" Stalnaker, "Twin Earth Revisited" Kaplan, How to Russell a Frege-Church, The Journal of Philosophy, November 6, 1975 Kripke, "A Puzzle about Belief" Spinelli, "What It Is to Be an Intentional Object," http://repositorio.ul.pt/handle/10451/24506 Lau and Deutsch, "Externalism about Mental Content," Stanford Encyclopedia Bo, "A Descriptivist Refutation of Kripke’s Modal Argument and of Soames’s Defence" Quine, "On What There Is" Stalnaker, "Assertion" Field, "Stalnaker on Intentionality" Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, ch. 9 Menzel, "Possible Worlds," Stanford Encyclopedia, §§1.1-.3 5. FOR 2/27: Mental Attitude (I): Individuating and Embedding the Attitudes Vendler, Res Cogitans, ch. 3 Geach, "Ascriptivism" Geach, "Assertion" Dennett, "True Believers: The Intentional Stance and Why It Works" (also week 3) Frege, "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry" Optional: Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, chs. 9-11 Vendler, Res Cogitans, ch. 2 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Lectures 1, 2, 8, and 12 Hanks, "The Content-Force Distinction" Hanks, "What are the Primary Bearers of Truth?" Recanati, "Content, Mood, and Force" Ostertag, "Two Aspects of Propositional Unity" Lycan, "Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude" Ludwig, "Propositions and Higher-Order Attitude Attributions" Vanderveken, "A General Logic of Propositional Attitudes" Humberstone, "Direction of Fit" Merricks, "Propositional Attitudes?" Moltmann, "Propositions, Attitudinal Objects, and the Distinction between Actions and Products" Montague, "Against Propositionalism" Grzankowski, "Attitudes towards Objects" Crane, "Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?" Ștefanov, "Propositional Attitudes as Speech Acts" 6. FOR 3/5: Thought and Speech (I): Original and Derived Intentionality and Social Anti-Individualism Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, ch. 1 (also week 2) Rosenthal, "Intentionality," plus postscript Dennett, "Intentionality," from Kinds of Minds Burge, "Individualism and the Mental" Stalnaker, "On What's in the Head" Optional: Chisholm, "Sentences about Believing" Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs," Fodor commentary, and Searle reply Loar, "Social Content and Psychological Content," Rosenthal, ed., The Nature of Mind Loar, "Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content" Davidson, "On Knowing One's Own Mind" Dennett, "True Believers: The Intentional Stance and Why It Works" Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," §§XII-XV Vouloumanos and Waxman, "Listen up! Speech is for Thinking during Infancy" 7. FOR 3/12: Thought and Speech (II): Verbal Expression, Moore's Paradox, and First-Person Access Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Part II, x Shoemaker, "On Knowing One's Own Mind" Rosenthal, "Moore's Paradox and Consciousness" Grice, "Meaning" Rosenthal, "The Mind and Its Expression" Optional: Bar-On and Long, "Avowals and First-Person Privilege," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, March 2001 Rosenthal, "Thinking that One Thinks" Austin, How to Do Things with Words, pp. 48-9 Grice, "Logic and Conversation" Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, chs. 6-7 Rosenthal, Consciousness and Mind, ch. 12 Grice, "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions" Descartes, Meditation II; if you don't have the Cottingham et al translation, Veitch, tr., here, is OK 8. FOR 3/19: Content (IV): Demonstrative Reference and the Indirect Reflexive Geach, "On Beliefs about Oneself" Perry, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical" Lewis, "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se" Rosenthal, "Awareness and Identification of Self," §2 Kaplan, "Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals" Optional: Chisholm, The First Person, chs. 3-4, Rosenthal, ed., The Nature of Mind Anscombe, "The First Person" Pylyshyn, "The Empirical Case for Bare Demonstratives in Vision" Pylyshyn, "Visual Indexes and Nonconceptual Reference" Pylyshyn, Demos of several Multiple Object Tracking Experiments Rosenthal, Consciousness and Mind, ch. 13, §v (ignore §vi), at http://tinyurl.com/drcunygc/DR-Unity-Self.pdf Braun, "Indexicals," Stanford Encyclopedia 9. FOR 3/26: Mental Attitude (II): Volitional States and Emotions Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, chs. 3-4, 9-11 Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" Gordon, "Emotions and Knowledge" Rosenthal, "Emotions and the Self" Optional: Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, chs. 3-4 Davidson, "Intending" Harman, Change in View, ch. 8 Armstrong, "Acting and Trying" Kenny, Emotions, from The Metaphysics of Mind Deonna and Teroni, "Emotions as Attitudes" Deonna and Teroni, "The Attitudinal Theory of Emotions" Lycan, "Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude" Haggard, Clark, and Kalogeras, "Voluntary Action and Conscious Awareness," Nature Neuroscience, April 2002 Castañeda, "Intentions and Intending," Americal Philosophical Quartery, April 1972 Rosenthal, Consciousness and Mind, ch. 11 Merricks, "Propositional Attitudes?" Griffiths, "Is Emotion a Natural Kind?" de Sousa, "Emotions," Stanford Encyclopedia Gordon, "Judgmental Emotions" Gordon, "The Aboutness of Emotions" 10. FOR 4/3: Thought and Speech (III): Theory of Mind and the False- Belief Test Wimmer & Perner, "Beliefs about Beliefs: Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children's Understanding of Deception" Fodor, "A Theory of the Child's Theory of Mind" Baillargeon, Scott, & He, "False-Belief Understanding in Infants" Buttelman, Carpenter, & Tomasello, "Eighteen-Month-Old Infants Show False Belief Understanding in an Active Helping Paradigm" Heyes, "False Belief in Infancy: A Fresh Look" Optional: Scott & Baillargeon, "How Fresh a Look? A Reply to Heyes" Heyes, "Rich Interpretations of Infant Behaviour are Popular, but are They Valid? A Reply to Scott and Baillargeon" Onishi and Baillargeon, "Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs?" Setoh, Scott, & Baillargeon, "Two-and-a-half-year-olds Succeed at a Traditional False-Belief Task with Reduced Processing Demands" Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, & Tomasello, "Great Apes Anticipate that Other Individuals Will Act According to False Beliefs" Lewis, "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications" Leslie, "Developmental Parallels in Understanding Minds and Bodies" Leslie, Friedman, & German, "Core Mechanisms in 'Theory of Mind'" Leslie, "Pretense and Representation: The Origins of 'Theory of Mind'," Psychological Review, 94, 4 (1987): 412-426 Perner, "The Many Faces of Belief: Reflections on Fodor's and the Child's Theory of Mind" Ruffman & Perner, "Do Infants Really Understand False Belief? Response to Leslie," Trends in Cognitive Sciences, October 2005 Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, "Three-Year-Olds' Difficulty with False Belief," British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 1987 Vouloumanos & Waxman, "Listen up! Speech is for Thinking during Infancy" No class April 10 or 17: Spring Break 11. FOR 4/23: No new readings—Abstracts Due! Abstracts are due on this day. 12. FOR 4/30: Thought and Speech (IV): Thought, Speech, and Consciousness Searle, "Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion, and Cognitive Science" Rosenthal, "On Being Accessible to Consciousness," commentary on Searle, pp. 621-622 Strawson, "Real Intentionality 3: Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness" Rosenthal, "Why Are Verbally Expressed Thoughts Conscious?" Byrne, review of Kriegel, ed., Phenomenal Intentionality Optional: Rosenthal, "Consciousness and Its Function" Rosenthal, "Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function," §5 Rosenthal, "Thinking that One Thinks" Montague, "Cognitive Phenomenology and Conscious Thought" Montague, "Cognitive Phenomenology: Bibliography," https://www.academia.edu/31011618/Oxford_Bibliographies_Cognitive_Phenomenology?campaign=upload_email Montague, "Cognitive Phenomenology" (Macmillan Handbook), https://www.academia.edu/31011653/Cognitive_Phenomenology_for_Macmillan_handbook_ Fodor and Lepore, "What Is the Connection Principle?" Searle, "The Connection Principle and the Ontology of the Unconscious: A Reply to Fodor and Lepore" Sundström, "Consciousness and the Intentionality of Action" Kriegel, "Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program" Green, review of Kriegel, The Sources of Intentionality Kriegel, "Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality" Loar, "Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content" Bayne and Montague, "Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction" 13. FOR 5/7: Content (V): Inference and Thought Processes Fodor, "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology" Harman, Thought, ch. 3 Harman, Change in View, ch. 1 Boghossian, "What Is Inference?" Harman, review of Grice, Aspects of Reason Optional: Harman, Change in View, chs. 2, 6 Wright, "Comment on Paul Boghossian, 'What is Inference’'" Hlobil, "Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on Inference" Dancy, review of Grice, Aspects of Reason Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," §§5-6 Brandom, "The Social Anatomy of Inference" 14. May 14 (last class): Mental Attitude (III): Relations among the Attitudes—Willing What to Think Williams, "Deciding to Believe" Shah and Velleman, "Doxastic Deliberation" Descartes, Meditation IV; the Cottingham et al translation is far the best. Rosenthal, "Will and the Theory of Judgment" Optional: Setiya, "Believing at Will," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2008 James, "The Will to Believe" --- rev. 12/28/19