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Selective Update, 1971-2000

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Additional abbreviations for update section: *APA* (*Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*); *CJP* (*Canadian Journal of Philosophy*); *E* (*Erkenntnis*); *Midwest* (*Midwest Studies in Philosophy*); *Mon* (*The Monist*); *MSPS* (*Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*); *N* (*Noûs*); *PAS* (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*); *PASS* (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*); *PPQ* (*Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*); *PP* (*Philosophical Perspectives*); *PPR* (*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*); *PT* (*Philosophical Topics*); *S* (*Synthese*); *SJP* (*The Southern Journal of Philosophy*); *BB* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell); *CA* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press); *Clarendon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press); *CUP* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); *Cornell* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press); *Harvard* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press); *Minn* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press); *MIT* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press/Bradford Books); *OUP* (New York: Oxford University Press); *PUP* (Princeton: Princeton University Press); *Routledge* (London: Routledge, or Routledge & Kegan Paul); *Yale* (New Haven: Yale University Press).

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